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AFTER OSAMA BIN LADEN: ASSASSINATION, TERRORISM, WAR, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Professor Louis René Beres
  
International law, always confronting multiple crises, is now in a 
protracted crisis itself. Regarding the struggle against terrorism, especially 
mass-casualty terrorism, states will increasingly require unorthodox means. 
In principle, at least, these means may sometimes include defensive first 
strikes that are known, jurisprudentially, as “anticipatory self-defense.” 
Such preemptive measures could range from individual “targeted killings,”1 
or assassinations,2 to assorted expressions of cyber-war, to more-or-less 
far-reaching military strikes. In all of these cases, the determinable lawful-
ness of preemption will ultimately depend, inter alia, upon the imminence 
and urgency of the particular danger posed. Although it can never be juris-
prudentially correct to willfully disregard the requirements of humanitarian 
international law, the law of armed conflict, there are occasions when ordi-
nary legal expectations will need to be suitably adapted to extraordinary 
circumstances. Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium, ibi decurritur ad extraor-
dinarium, “Where the ordinary remedy fails, recourse must be had to an 
extraordinary one.” Presently, even after the killing of Osama bin Laden, 
  
  Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), and is the author of many 
books and articles dealing with international law. He is Professor of Political Science and 
International Law at Purdue. 
 1 See AMOS N. GUIORA, FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM 81 (2008) (“Targeted 
killing is a policy whereby an individual suspected of involvement in a serious act of terror-
ism is killed, provided there is no other viable alternative to prevent the attack.”). 
 2 See Amos N. Guiora, Op-Ed, Targeting Bin Laden: Legal, Geopolitical and Strategic 
Issues, JURIST (May 4, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/05/amos-guiora-targeting-bin-
laden.php (arguing that killing a terrorist is not an “assassination,” because that term is re-
served for the killing of a political leader, and that, “targeted killing” of terrorist leaders may 
be permissible if in compliance with certain specific legal standards). Concerning Osama bin 
Laden’s death, Guiora writes that: 
Notwithstanding important questions regarding the limits and legality of pre-
emptive self-defense, bin Laden’s continued threats and his proven ability to suc-
cessfully conduct attacks—9/11 in particular—unequivocally categorized him as a 
legitimate target at the time he was killed. The attack, therefore, was not an act of 
retribution under international law. It also adhered to fundamental international law 
principles, including distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and alterna-
tives. As a result, the operation was the manifestation of lawful and legitimate self-
defense. 
Id. 
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counter-terror operators, confronted with adversarial groups that may still 
act as capable proxies for certain enemy states, will need to capably resist 
all forms of “perfidy,” and also to understand that such resistance can be 
both indispensable, and law-enforcing. This paper will examine pertinent 
strategic options from an informed jurisprudential perspective, conceptual-
ly, but also with particular, or at least deducible, reference to Northern 
Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, there will be broader and timely 
excursions into the often related and interpenetrating legal issues of “hu-
manitarian intervention,”3 or the “duty to protect.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
However reluctantly, even after the successful American assassina-
tion4 of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011,5 the United States and its allies 
  
 3 In support of humanitarian intervention as a general principle under international law 
see Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry Into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND 
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 198 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. 
Scheffer, eds., 1991) (discussing humanitarian intervention for human rights violations); 
Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of 
Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT’L L. 547, 597–611 (1987) (setting 
forth criteria for humanitarian intervention); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States 
to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 345 (1967) (justifying humanitarian inter-
vention because existing international mechanisms provide inadequate protection). But see 
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340 (1963) (observ-
ing that the disappearance of humanitarian intervention from modern practice presents a 
beneficial development); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 
105 (1968) (stating the law against intervention); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF 
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 169 (1948) (discussing intervention by states to protect their 
nationals). 
 4 Under U.S. law, Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, section 2.11 prohibits 
assassination. Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1988) (“No person employed by or 
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
assassination.”), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). Even prior to Executive Order 12333, 
general international law, both treaty law and customary law, criminalized assassination, and 
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remain engaged in an inherently inconclusive6 “war”7 on terrorism.8 On its 
face, this engagement is readily comprehensible. All war, after all, accepts 
the idea of killing as remediation.  
  
thus the “supreme law of the land” in the U.S. long forbade assassination. See U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, § 2; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678–79 (1900) (“International law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this 
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”); The Lola, 
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J. concurring) (per curiam) (dismissing the action, but making several 
references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses), cert. denied. 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985) (discussing the concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of 
significant international standards embodied in the principle of violations of international 
law). 
 5 See Tim Fernholz & Jim Tankersley, Payback, NAT’L J., May 7, 2011, at 28, available 
at http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-cost-of-bin-laden-3-trillion-over-15-years-2 
0110505?mrefid=site_search&page=1. “By conservative estimates, bin Laden cost the Unit-
ed States at least $3 trillion over fifteen years . . . .” Id. This calculated figure includes the 
costs of: (1) disruptions on the domestic economy; (2) wars and heightened security; and (3) 
efforts to find and capture bin Laden. Id. 
 6 See GUIORA, supra note 1, at 5 (defining terrorism as “the new Hundred Years’ War”). 
 7 The Obama Administration no longer uses the Bush-era phrase “War on Terror.” More-
over, in the strict jurisprudential sense, there can be no formal condition of belligerency 
between a state and an insurgent ideology, nor between a state and a particular terrorist 
group. This is critical to understanding that lawful targeted killing of terrorists need not nec-
essarily presume a “state of war.” Under international law, distinguishing between a state of 
war and a state of peace can also be generally problematic. Traditionally, a “formal” war was 
said to exist only after a state had issued a proper declaration of war. The Hague Convention 
III codified this position in 1907. See The Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of 
Hostilities, art 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 263 (providing that hostili-
ties must not commence without “previous and explicit warning” in the form of a declaration 
of war or an ultimatum). Under present circumstances, where certain expressions of anticipa-
tory self-defense might be essential, this requirement is moot. Further, in the post-Charter 
(post-1945) world legal order, any formal declaration of war could be construed as “aggres-
sion,” providing still another reason why Hague Convention III expectations are no longer 
meaningful. 
 8 On defining terrorism, see GUIORA, supra note 1, at 7–28. In narrow military or opera-
tional terms, terrorism is sometimes understood as “Irregular Warfare.” See Heinz Vetschera, 
Low-Intensity Conflict: Theory and Concept, in 3 INT’L MILITARY AND DEFENSE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1578, 1578 (Trevor N. Dupuy et al. eds., 1993). Here, “Low-Intensity Con-
flict,” (LIC) is a term covering a broad variety of military and nonmilitary operations below 
the level of conventional combat between regular forces. Id. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
include terrorism and insurgent war in their definition of LIC. Id. Counterinsurgency opera-
tions are normally illustrative also of LIC. Unconventional warfare can occur in a low-
intensity conflict environment. Terrorism is one of several possible manifestations of uncon-
ventional warfare. For a somewhat different perspective, see James P. Terry, Legal Aspects 
of Terrorism in 6 INT’L MILITARY AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 2431, 2432 (Trevor N. 
Dupuy et al. eds., 1993) (“International terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated 
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At the same time, ironically, while virtually all societies and civili-
zations routinely accept the permissibility of warfare with vast armies and 
armaments in particular circumstances (to wit, the long tradition of a just 
war doctrine9 in philosophy, theology and jurisprudence), most would none-
theless still question the presumed legality and ethical correctness of assas-
sination and targeted killing.10  
These denials could sometimes accompany even the most incon-
testable expressions of anticipatory self-defense.11 We might also discover 
  
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets in or from a second state by subnational 
groups or individuals.”). 
 9 See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF 
NATURE 165 (Ian Hunter & David Saunders eds., Andrew Tooke trans., 2003) (1673).  
[I]t is sometimes both Lawful and Necessary to go to War, when by means of an-
other’s Injustice, we cannot, without the Use of Force, preserve what is our own, 
nor injoy [sic] those Rights which are properly ours . . . . 
The just Causes upon which a War may be undertaken, come all to these: The 
Preservation of our selves, and what we have, against an unjust Invasion; and this 
sort of War is called Defensive. The Maintenance and Recovery of our Rights from 
those that refuse to pay them: The Reparation of Injuries done to us, and Caution 
against them for the future. And this sort of War is called Offensive. 
Id. 
Here it is noteworthy that Pufendorf cites often to Hugo Grotius. Id. (citing HUGO GROTIUS, 
THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625)). Natural law origins that influenced Pufendorf can also 
be found in Aristotle’s conception of man as a rational and social being, ARISTOTLE, Meta-
physica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) and in the work of 
Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), who had grounded natural law in a reason shared between 
man and God. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1274). 
 10 See Amos N. Guiora, Determining a Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of the Decision 
Maker, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2012) (“Two central questions with respect to opera-
tional counterterrorism are who can be targeted, and for when is the identified legitimate 
target a legitimate target. Those two questions go to the heart of both self defense and the use 
of power.”) 
 11 For earlier writings by this author on anticipatory self-defense under international law, 
see Louis René Beres, The Project Daniel Group, Israel’s Strategic Future: Project Daniel, 
in ARIEL CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Ariel Ctr. Pol’y Res., Pol’y Paper No. 155, 2004) 
(this paper was prepared especially for presentation to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sha-
ron, and given to him by hand on January 16, 2003) [hereinafter Beres, Israel’s Strategic 
Future]; Louis René Beres, Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel’s Strategic, 
Tactical, and Legal Options, in ARIEL CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Ariel Ctr. Pol’y Res., 
Pol’y Paper No. 102, 2000) [hereinafter Beres, Security Threats and Effective Remedies]; 
Louis René Beres, Israel’s Survival Imperatives: The Oslo Agreements in International Law 
and National Strategy, in ARIEL CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Ariel Ctr. Pol’y Res., Pol’y 
Paper No. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Beres, Israel’s Survival Imperatives]; Louis René Beres, 
Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The View From International Law, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 847, 857 (2003); Louis René Beres, The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of 
Preemption: Can It Include Assassination?, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 164 (2003); 
Louis René Beres & Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of 
Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP L.J. 437, 439–40 (1995); Louis René 
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similarly far-reaching rejections of preemptive strikes12 that would involve 
larger-scale expressions of military force.  
For many years, I have argued, albeit reluctantly, for the residual 
legality and pragmatic reasonableness13 of assassination as counter-
terrorism.14 The core of my sometimes (seemingly) paradoxical argument 
  
Beres, Striking “First”: Israel’s Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law, 14 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 4 (1991); Louis René Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory 
Self-Defense: Is It Permissible?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13, 25–35 (1993); Louis René 
Beres, On Assassination as Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 334 
(1992); Louis René Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel’s Right of Anticipatory Self-
Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 111, 115 (1994); Louis René 
Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 259, 262 (1991); Louis René Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 93–94 (1991); Louis René Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, “Pal-
estine,” and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 76 (1992); and Louis 
René Beres, Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 
JERUSALEM J. INT’L REL. 1 (1991).  
 12 Preemption has only strategic (not jurisprudential) meaning. It references a purely mili-
tary strategy that involves striking a presumed enemy first, with the expectation that the only 
determinable alternative is to be struck first oneself. See David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Virtues of 
Preemptive Deterrence, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2006). A preemptive attack differs 
from a preventive attack, which is launched out of concern for longer-term deterioration in 
the pertinent military balance—sometime called the “correlation of forces”—rather than any 
fear of imminent hostilities. In a preemptive strike, the enemy’s action is anticipated in a 
very short time, while in the preventive strike, the interval is considerably longer. See 
Dwight Sullivan, Legal Restictions on the Right to Use Force Against International Terror-
ism, 10 ASILS INT’L L.J. 169, 174–77 (1986). Because a preventive strike is never justified 
under international law, the distinction between preemptive and preventive attacks is juris-
prudentially significant. See Amy E. Eckert & Manoohner Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire: 
The First Strike Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 133–32 (2004) (examining the doctrine of preemptive self-defense 
and the ICJ’s interpretation in the Nicaragua v. United States case). 
 13 The integral importance of reasonableness to legal judgment was already well-known in 
ancient Israel and was incorporated into early biblical writings. See David Wermuth, Human 
Rights in Jewish Law: Contemporary Juristic and Rabbinic Conceptions, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 1101, 1104–05 (2011). They accommodated Reason within their particular system of re-
vealed law. See Ecclesiastes 37.16. Jewish theory of law, insofar as it displays the qualities of 
Natural Law, offers a transcending order revealed by the Divine Word as interpreted by 
Reason. See id. at 32:23, 37:16, 37:13–14, 37:16 (“And let the counsel of thine own heart 
stand . . . . For a man’s mind is sometimes wont to tell him more than seven watchmen that 
sit above in an [sic] high tower. . . . Let Reason go before every enterprize [sic] and counsel 
before any action.”). 
 14 See Beres, Security Threats and Effective Remedies, supra note 11, at 36–39; Beres, 
Israel’s Survival Imperatives, supra note 11, at 3 (1998); Louis René Beres, The Newly-
Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination, 31 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 157, 167–75 (2003); Louis René Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-
Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 329–33 (1992); Louis René Beres, 
Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The View From International Law, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 847, 864–65 (2003); Louis René Beres, Assassination and the Law: A Policy Memoran-
dum, 18 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 299, 301 (1995); and Louis René Beres, Victims and 
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has been a distinctly utilitarian and humanitarian calculation: Simply stat-
ed, at least on occasion, such expressions of violence can best preserve in-
nocent human lives.15  
Over this extended period, I have maintained that the preemptive 
assassination of terrorists who plan large-scale or unconventional mass cas-
ualty attacks against Americans and others could ultimately save the lives of 
a great many intended terrorist victims. As an indispensable legal corollary, 
any such targeted killing should nonetheless adhere to the applicable long-
standing customary and codified rules of war,16 limitations that concern 
standards of discrimination,17 proportionality18 and military necessity.19 
  
Executioners: Atrocity, Assassination and International Law, 7 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 
1, 6–8 (1995). 
 15 See HUGO GROTIUS, GROTIUS ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN ABRIDGED 
TRANSLATION 23 (William Whewell trans., 1853) (1625) (“[J]ust wars arise from our love of 
the innocent.”); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. II, Sec. 359 (George Burges trans., Walter Dunne 
1901) (“Justice is a contract neither to do, nor to suffer, wrong.”); CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE 
LEGIBUS, reprinted in 16 CICERO: IN TWENTY-EIGHT VOLUMES 191–92 (Clinton Walker 
Keyes trans., 10th ed. 1988) (presenting the conversation of Philus in Book III, § 5). 
 16 On jus in bello, or the rules of war, Samuel Pufendorf offers us an early expression on 
operative limits:  
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we should 
distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and what we can-
not bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he who has declared 
himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express threat to bring the worst 
of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies, gives us a free hand against 
himself, without restriction. Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the 
clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy than de-
fense, or the vindication of our right, and security for the future, require. 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 169 
(James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991). 
 17 Codified criteria for distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant populations 
were introduced for the first time under international law at the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 18 The principle of proportionality has its origins in the biblical Lex Talionis (the law of 
exact retaliation). The "eye for an eye, tooth for tooth" expression is found in three separate 
passages of the Jewish Torah, or Biblical Pentateuch. These Torah rules are likely related to 
the CODE OF HAMMURABI (c. 1728–1686 B.C.E.), the first written evidence for penalizing 
wrongdoing with exact retaliation. In matters concerning personal injury, “the code pre-
scribes taking eye for an eye (# 196), breaking bone for bone (# 197) and extracting tooth for 
tooth (# 199).” MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND 
LITERATURE 62 (1990). Among the ancient Hebrews, we should speak not of the Lex Talio-
nis, but of several congruous laws. The Lex Talionis appears in three passages of the Torah. 
In their sequence of probable antiquity, they are as follows: Exodus 21:22–25; Deuteronomy 
19:19–21; and Leviticus 24:17–21. These three passages address specific concerns: hurting a 
pregnant woman, perjury, and guarding Yahweh's altar against defilement. HENBERG, supra 
at 68–72. In contemporary international law, the principle of proportionality can be found in 
the traditional view that a state offended by another state's use of force can, if the offending 
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Logically speaking, there is no reason why any such expectations should be 
considered unreasonable. 
Legal and operational issues can be intertwined in very complex 
synergies. Terror crimes are not necessarily singular acts of violence. Ra-
ther, they can figure as a part of a much larger strategy of warfare. Terrorist 
harms may be inflicted as part of a broader strategy of attrition. 
In the strict military sense, a war of attrition represents a condition 
of belligerency that is designed to “wear down” an enemy, by constant pres-
sure, in order to weaken, exhaust or destroy that enemy’s forces. The key 
word, attrition, derives from the Latin word attire, to weaken, which itself 
stems from terrere, to rub. In these times, even after Osama bin Laden,20 a 
war of attrition21 may be fought, in whole or in part, via carefully construct-
ed acts of terror. 
  
state refuses to make amends, take “proportionate” reprisals. INGRID DETTER DE LUPIS, THE 
LAW OF WAR 75 (1987); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 174. Similarly, the American Convention on Human 
Rights art. 27(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 152 allows such derogations “in time of 
war, public danger or other emergency which threaten the independence or security of a 
party” on “condition of proportionality.” In essence, the military principle of proportionality 
requires that the amount of destruction permitted must be proportionate to the importance of 
the objective. In contrast, the political principle of proportionality states “a war cannot be just 
unless the evil that can reasonably be expected to ensure from the war is less than the evil 
that can reasonably be expected to ensue if the war is not fought.” DOUGLAS P. LACKEY, THE 
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 40 (1989). 
 19 The principle of military necessity has been defined authoritatively as follows: “Only 
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required 
for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life 
and physical resources may be applied.” ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS 
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 10 (3rd ed. 2000) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, 6.2.6.4.2, 
(July 2007)). The term “military necessity” is found, inter alia, in the 1946 Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: Extracts on Crimes Against International 
Law, in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 155 
(1989). Referring to Article 6(b) of the London Charter, August 8, 1945:  
War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave 
labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
22 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL NUREMBURG, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 413–14, 497 (1948).  
 20 See generally Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin for 
Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A1.  
 21 It is worth noting here that a war of attrition can also be fought, simultaneously, on the 
legal “battlefield.” Here, an enemy would be employing “lawfare,” a deliberate strategy to 
use (or misuse) law in conjunction with traditional military means as a means of weakening 
the target State. See generally Symposium, Lawfare!, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–11 
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In considering assassination or targeted killing as counter-terrorism, 
there is also a core question of justice.22 Among the most sacred of Ameri-
can ideals is the non-derogatable rule of nullum crimen sine poena, “No 
crime without a punishment.” This fully peremptory principle is originally 
drawn from ancient Israel, and from ancient Greece.23 Significantly, it is 
explicitly codified in the always-binding Nuremberg24 Principles of interna-
tional law.25  
  
(2010) (see particularly, the foreword by Prof. Michael P. Scharf and Shannon Pagano defin-
ing Lawfare and its history).  
 22 We may also recall Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Augustine:  
St. Augustine says: “There is no law unless it be just.” So the validity of law de-
pends upon its justice. But in human affairs, a thing is said to be just when it ac-
cords aright with the rule of reason; and as we have already seen, the first rule of 
reason is the Natural Law. Thus, all humanly enacted laws are in accord with rea-
son to the extent that they derive from the Natural Law. And if a human law is at 
variance in any particular with the Natural Law, it is no longer legal, but rather a 
corruption of law. 
A.P. D'ENTRÈVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 42–43 (H.J. 
Paton ed., 1964) (1951) (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, II SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1014 (Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911)).  
 23 Ancient Israel was especially specific that the wrongful shedding of blood was always 
an abomination, and this abomination always required expiation: “For blood pollutes the 
land, and no expiation can be made for the land, for the blood that is shed in it, except by the 
blood of him who shed it.” Numbers 35:33. The Hebrew belief in “pollution” paralleled that 
of the ancient Greeks. The Erinyes do for the Greeks what Yahweh does for the ancient 
Hebrews: they demand the blood of homiciders. HENBERG, supra note 18, at 77. Pre-Socratic 
philosophers, especially Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, displayed a metaphysical 
view of retributive justice as inherent in the cosmos. See generally WERNER JAEGER, 
PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 150–69 (Gilbert Highet trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 
2d ed. 1945); HUGH LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 80–81 (1971); Gregory Vlastos, 
Solonian Justice, 41 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 65 (1946). Aeschylus provides a particularly fine 
sense of the Greek view of punishment. In his THE LIBATION-BEARERS, the chorus intones: 
“The spirit of Right cries out aloud, and extracts atonement due: blood stroke for the stroke 
of blood shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks the voice of the age-old wisdom.” 
AESCHYLUS, THE LIBATION-BEARERS 310–14 (1952). 
 24 The Nuremberg Trials concluded with an explicit reaffirmation of Nullum crimen sine 
poena. The tribunal, therefore, based its sentencing not on expectations of reformation or 
deterrence, but, more narrowly, on retribution. See SIR WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF 
PUNISHMENT (1968). 
 25 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (Dec. 11, 1946). From the 
point of view of the United States, all Nuremberg obligations are essentially doubly binding. 
This is because these obligations represent not only current obligations of international law, 
but also the Higher Law obligations engendered by the American political tradition. By its 
codification of the principle that fundamental human rights are not an internal question for 
each state, but an unassailable postulate of international community, the Nuremberg Obliga-
tions offer a point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and the jurisprudential 
foundations of our American Republic. 
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Where planners of such plainly egregious crimes26 as the September 
11th terrorist attacks on the United States could not be punished by any 
normal judicial remedy (we could not, for example, in the matter of Osama 
bin Laden, have ever expected sufficient international compliance with the 
codified and customary norm of aut dedere, aut punire, “extradite or prose-
cute”),27 the predictably effective choice was to leave the unrepentant mur-
derer unpunished,28 or to punish him extra-judicially.29 Pursuant to orders 
from U.S. President Barack Obama, the correct decision was carried out by 
U.S. Special Forces on May 1, 2011.30 
  
 26 Planners of egregious crimes are known under international law as hostes humani gene-
ris, or “common enemies of humankind.” Harvard Research in International Law: Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 566 (Supp. 1935) 
(quoting Coke, C. J. in King v. Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 E.R. 23 (1615) (“a pirate est hostes 
humani generis”)). 
 27 The legal expectation to “extradite or prosecute” is deducible from nullum crimen sine 
poena, “No crime without a punishment.” Existing since antiquity, it is a peremptory expec-
tation with roots in both positive and natural law. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF 
WAR AND PEACE 384–85 (William Evats trans., 1945); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE 217 (Thomas M. Pomroy trans., 1805). For 
an excellent contemporary elucidation of extradition and prosecution under international 
criminal law, see CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY (1992). 
 28 A similar choice confronted Israel’s prime minister after the murder of Israel’s Olympic 
athletes in Munich in 1972. Years later, after a number of the “Munich masterminds” had 
been assassinated by Israel, I spoke with Aharon Yariv, Golda Meir’s counter-terrorism 
advisor at the time of the Munich massacre, and then Director of the Jaffee Center for Strate-
gic Studies in Tel-Aviv. In our private conversation, General Yariv confirmed that Mrs. Meir 
had indeed been very focused on “No crime without a punishment” reasoning. Interview with 
Aharon Yariv, former Counter-Terrorism Advisor to Golda Meir and Director, Jaffee Center 
for Strategic Studies, at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University (Nov. 
21, 1984). 
 29 This, despite the presumption of international law that states exhibit solidarity in the 
fight against serious crime. See generally CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, (Theodore Mommsen et al. 
eds., 1888), available at http://www.archive.org/details/corpusjuriscivil00krueuoft; GROTIUS 
supra note 27, at Book II, Ch. 20; DE VATTEL supra note 27, at Book I, Ch. 19. The case for 
universal jurisdiction over egregious crimes, which derives from the antecedent presumption 
of solidarity, is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. These Con-
ventions unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish 
certain “grave breaches” of their rules. The term “grave breaches” applies to certain infrac-
tions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977. The High Contracting 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions are under obligation “to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,” a 
grave breach of the Convention. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, art 146. Grave 
Breaches “shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or 
property protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health . . . .” Id. art. 147.  
 30 As assassination is illegal under U.S. law, both by executive order and by international 
treaty. President Barack Obama was unable to explicitly use this term to describe the U.S. 
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Punishment31 is always at the heart of justice,32 but those who are 
responsible for our national security must be less concerned with the pun-
ishment of past terrorist crimes, or pure retributivism,33 than with the pre-
  
military killing of Osama bin Laden. Also, the President of the United States has taken an 
oath required by Article 2, Section 1, and Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution “to preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 7. In 
view of Article VI of the Constitution, and pertinent Supreme Court decisions, the President 
is sworn to uphold the international law prohibitions concerning assassination. Id. art. VI. 
Further, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution requires the president to “take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed,” a charge that extends to respect for the lives of public officials 
in other (nation) states. Id. art. II, § 3.  
 31 On punishment of Iraqi crimes committed under Saddam Hussein, see Louis René Ber-
es, After the Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 
(1992); Louis René Beres, Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 335 (1993), Louis René Beres, Iraqi Crimes During and After the 
Gulf War: The Imperative Response of International Law, 15 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 675 (1993); Louis René Beres, Iraqi Deeds and International Law: The Question of 
Punishment, 14 JERUSALEM J. INT’L RELATIONS 22 (1992); Louis René Beres, Prosecuting 
Iraqi Crimes Against Israel During the Gulf War: Jerusalem’s Rights Under International 
Law, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337 (1992); Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes: 
Fulfilling the Expectations of International Law After the Gulf War, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L., 425 
(1992); Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under International Law: An American 
Constitutional Imperative, 15 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 91 (1992); Louis René Beres, Prosecuting 
Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied and Israeli Rights Under International Law, 16 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41 (1989); Louis René Beres, Toward Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes 
Under International Law: Jurisprudential Foundations and Jurisdictional Choices, 22 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 127 (1991); Louis René Beres, Punishing Genocide and Crimes Against Hu-
manity After the Gulf War: Iraqi Crimes and International Law 41 (1990) (occasional paper, 
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Programme for Strategic and International Securi-
ty Studies, (Geneva, Switzerland)); Louis René Beres, Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The 
View From International Law, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 847 (2003).  
 32 On retributive justice, see especially Immanuel Kant. Kant identifies the mode and 
measure of punishment as follows: “This is the Right of Retaliation (jus talionis), and, 
properly understood, it is the only Principle which in regulating a Public Court . . . can defi-
nitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE 
SCIENCE OF RIGHT 170 (W. Hastie trans., 1790). On the retributive view of justice in general, 
see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 91–139 (1978); SIR WALTER 
MOBERLEY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 96–120 (1968); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND 
PUNISHMENT 38–65 (1987); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363–97 (1981); 
JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); D.J. Galligan, The Return to Retribution in 
Penal Theory, in CRIME, PROOF, AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 
154, 154–57 (C. Tapper ed., 1981); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 67–
110 (1989); TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 22–51 (1969); 
GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 320–26 (1964); HEINRICH 
OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1975); MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, 
PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 21–33 (1981). For a very broad but fascinating treatment of these 
issues, see HENBERG, supra note 18. 
 33 Immanuel Kant has perhaps provided the best example of the theory of pure retributiv-
ism, but Kant is not advancing a case for revenge. Rather, Kantian retribution must always be 
an action of the state against the criminal; it is always an impersonal action, undertaken 
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vention of future crimes.34 The imperative to seek such prevention is all the 
more considerable when such attacks are apt to employ weapons of mass 
destruction.35 Referencing settled international law,36 the U.S. has this de-
fensive obligation, and a corresponding authority, under the customary right 
  
without passion, and as a distinctly sacred duty. This punishment of criminals, argues Kant, 
is a “categorical imperative.” In his reasoning, we may discover the strongest possible affir-
mation of Nullum crimen sine poena, or “No crime without a punishment.” See IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS (Rev. Henry Calderwood ed., J.W. Semple trans., 3d ed. 
1886), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1443. 
 34 Regarding the legal obligation to punish, see Principles of International Cooperation In 
The Detection, Arrest, Extradition And Punishment Of Persons Guilty Of War Crimes And 
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. 
Doc. A/9030, at 78 (Dec. 3, 1973). Other resolutions affirm that a refusal “to cooperate in the 
arrest, extradition, trial and punishment” of such persons is contrary to the United Nations 
Charter “and to generally recognized norms of international law.” G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. 
GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429, at 88 (Dec. 18, 1971); see also G.A. 
Res. 96, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc A/64, at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946). As to the 
responsibility of states toward Geneva Law in particular, common article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions addresses the obligation of all signatories “to respect and to ensure respect” for 
the Conventions “in all circumstances.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, art 1. 
 35 For earlier writings by this author on nuclear terrorism, see Louis René Beres, The 
Threat of Palestinian Nuclear Terrorism in the Middle East, 15 INT’L PROBS. 48 (1976); 
Louis René Beres, Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?, in NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE 
THREAT 45 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1986); Louis René Beres, Preventing 
Nuclear Terrorism: Responses to Terrorist Grievances, in PREVENTING NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM: THE REPORT AND PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON PREVENTION 
OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 146 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987); Louis René 
Beres, Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERORRISM: 
CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS 228 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990); Louis René 
Beres, Terrorism and International Law, 3 FLA. INT’L L.J. 291 (1988); Louis René Beres, 
International Terrorism and World Order: The Nuclear Threat, 12 STAN. J. INT’L STUD. 131 
(1977); Louis René Beres, Terrorism and International Security: The Nuclear Threat, 26 
CHITTY’S L.J. 73 (1978); Louis René Beres, Hic Sunt Dracones: The Nuclear Threat of In-
ternational Terrorism 9(2) PARAMETERS: J. U.S. ARMY WAR C. 11 (1979); Louis René Beres, 
International Terrorism and World Order: The Nuclear Threat, in STUDIES IN NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM 360 (Augustus R. Norton & Martin H. Greenberg eds., 1979); LOUIS RENÉ 
BERES, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (1979); LOUIS RENÉ 
BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); Louis René Beres, 
Confronting Nuclear Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS J. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129 (1990); Louis 
René Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 
(1994); Louis René Beres, Israel, the ‘Peace Process,’ and Nuclear Terrorism: A Jurispru-
dential Perspective, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 767 (1996); Louis René Beres, ‘Pre-
venting the Blood-Dimmed Tide’: How To Avoid Nuclear Terrorism Against the United 
States, 24 STRATEGIC REV. 76 (1996); Louis René Beres, The United States and Nuclear 
Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 327 (1994). 
 36 Per earlier clarification, it is worth recalling here that international law is an inherent 
part of the law of the United States. See The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see 
also, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726, F. 2d, at 
781, 788. 
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of anticipatory self-defense, and also under the treaty37-based right of self-
defense “following an armed attack,” found at article 51 of the U.N.     
Charter.  
Acknowledging this obligation and authority, former U.S. President 
George W. Bush, on September 20, 2002, issued The National Security 
Strategy of the United States.38 Unilaterally extending the U.S.’s right of 
preemption in foreign affairs, this Bush Doctrine,39 drawing upon anteced-
ent principles of law and justice, asserted that traditional concepts of deter-
rence will not work against an enemy “whose avowed tactics are wanton 
destruction and the targeting of innocents . . . .” It continued: “We must 
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries.” This “adaptation,” of course, meant nothing less than 
striking first wherever an emergent threat to the United States was presumed 
to be unacceptable. 
Might the broadened right of preemption asserted by the former 
president have included assassination? Should it have included assassina-
tion? We know, of course, that the current administration essentially contin-
ues to quietly support certain core principles of assassination and targeted 
killing, at least in particular reference to Osama bin Laden, but is this sup-
port jurisprudentially correct? Did President Barack Obama authorize the 
targeted killing of bin Laden primarily as an expression of anticipatory self-
defense, or as pure punishment?40 
Normally, we think of preemptive strikes in terms of much larger-
scale military operations directed against enemy forces and/or infrastruc-
  
 37 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is always an inter-
national agreement “concluded between States . . . .” Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 38 See PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/ 
nss/2002/.  
 39 For more on the Bush Doctrine, see AMOS N. GUIORA, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM 126–28 (2008); see also William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend 
Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1365, 1365–1492. 
 40 On pure punishment and legal philosophy, Plato regarded criminality as an ailment of 
the “soul,” much as physical disease represents an ailment of the body. His recommendations 
for punishment, therefore, derive from a presumed need to restore order to the soul. Here, the 
criminal must always receive a positive benefit from punishment. Without such a benefit, 
reasons Plato, punishment would cease to be good and just. Discarding the expectations of 
pure retributivism, Plato believes that punishment is intended solely to turn others from vice, 
and to teach virtue. See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 324 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 2009); PLATO, 
GORGIAS 525 (Gonzalez Lodge trans., Boston, Gionn & Co. 1891); PLATO, REPUBLIC 380 
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 2009); PLATO, PHAEDO (Edward Meredith Cope trans., London, 
Cambridge Warehouse 1875); PLATO, LAWS 854, 862, 934, 957 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
2008). 
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tures. Moreover, there are substantial prohibitions of assassination in do-
mestic and international law that would seem, prima facie, to rule out this 
particular use of force as a proper expression of anticipatory self-defense. 
Yet, when we examine the issues purposefully and dispassionately, and 
without any regard to specific prohibitions in law, it will sometimes turn out 
that assassination is clearly the most humane and simultaneously useful 
form of preemption. We must, therefore, get consciously beyond any deep-
seated visceral objections that may be detached from rational jurisprudential 
calculations, to a measured and careful legal comparison of targeted killing 
with all other available preemption options. To be sure, assassination is not 
a “nice” instrument of justice or security, but neither is full-scale war. 
International law is not a suicide pact.41 The right of self-defense by 
forestalling an attack was already established by Hugo Grotius in Book II of 
The Law of War and Peace in 1625.42 Recognizing the need for “present 
danger,” and threatening behavior that is “imminent in a point of time,”43 
Grotius indicates that self-defense is to be permitted not only after an attack 
has already been suffered, but also in advance, where “the deed may be an-
ticipated.”44 “It be lawful to kill him,” says Grotius, “who is preparing to 
kill . . . .” 45  
What particular strategies and tactics may be implemented as ap-
propriate instances of anticipatory self-defense? Might they even include 
assassination?46 Understood as tyrannicide,47 assassination has sometimes 
  
 41 International law is authoritatively deducible from Natural Law. According to Black-
stone, this is the reason that the law of nations is always binding upon all individuals and all 
states. In this connection, each state and its leaders are always expected “to aid and enforce 
the law of nations, as part of the common law, by inflicting an adequate punishment upon 
offenses against that universal law . . . .” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, PUBLIC WRONGS, in 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book 4 Ch. 1 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & 
Co. 1893). 
 42 See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution 1913) (1625), reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168–75 (James Brown Scott ed., 1995). 
 43 Id. at 174. 
 44 Id. at 173–74. 
 45 Id. at 177. 
 46 See Louis René Beres, The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can it 
Include Assassination?, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 158 n.15 (2002). 
Jurisprudentially, of course, it would also be reasonable to examine assassination 
as a possible form of ordinary self-defense, i.e., as a forceful measure of self-help 
short of war that is undertaken after an armed attack occurs. Tactically, however, 
there are at least two serious problems with such an examination: (1) In view of the 
ongoing proliferation of extraordinarily destructive weapons technologies, waiting 
to resort to ordinary self-defense could be very dangerous or even fatal; and (2) as-
sassination, while it may prove helpful in preventing an attack in the first place, is 
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been acceptable under international law (e.g., Aristotle’s Politics; Plutarch’s 
Lives, and Cicero’s De Officiis).48 Our primary concern, however, is not 
with the international law of human rights,49 but rather with those equally 
peremptory rights50 of legitimate self-defense,51 and national self-protection. 
  
far less likely to be useful in mitigating further harm once an attack has already 
been launched.  
Id. 
 47 Without appropriate criteria of differentiation, judgments concerning tyrannicide are 
inevitably personal and subjective. The hero of Albert Camus' THE JUST ASSASSINS, Ivan 
Kaliayev, a fictional adaptation of the assassin of the Grand Duke Sergei, says that he threw 
bombs, not at humanity, but at tyranny. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE JUST ASSASSINS, reprinted 
in CALIGULA AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 282 (Stuart Gilbert Trans., 1966). How shall he be 
judged? Seneca is reputed to have said that no offering can be more agreeable to God than 
the blood of a tyrant. See THE TERRORISM READER: FROM ARISTOTLE TO THE IRA AND THE 
PLO 1–3, 7–9 (Walter Laqueur ed., 1978). But, who is to determine authoritatively that a 
particular leader is indeed a tyrant? Dante confined the murderers of Julius Caesar to the very 
depths of hell, but the Renaissance rescued them and the Enlightenment even made them 
heroes. Id. 
 48 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK V: THE ORIGIN OF TYRANNY, reprinted in, THE 
TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY 10–13 (Walter Lacquer, ed., 1978) (c. 350 
B.C.E.); PLUTARCH, LIVES VI: BRUTUS, reprinted in, THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL 
ANTHOLOGY, 17–19 (Walter Lacquer, ed., 1978) (c. 100 B.C.E.); CICERO, DE OFFICIIS: NO 
FELLOWSHIP WITH TYRANTS, reprinted in, THE TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL 
ANTHOLOGY, 16 (Walter Lacquer, ed., 1978) (c. 44 B.C.E.).  
 49 See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005; Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; see also Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women, Mar. 31 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. 
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 66 (Dec. 14, 1961); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 19, 1966); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1966, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123.  
 50 See generally Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, art. 53 (“[A] 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permit-
ted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law hav-
ing the same character.”).  
 51 The right of self-defense should not be confused with reprisal. Although both are com-
monly known as measures of self-help short of war, an essential difference lies in their re-
spective purpose. Reprisals take place after the harm has already been experienced; they are 
punitive in character and cannot be undertaken for protection. Self-defense, on the other 
hand, is by its very nature intended to mitigate harm. See generally Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th 
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II. ASSASSINATION DURING A CONDITION OF PEACE 
Under normal circumstances, the assassination of officials in other 
states (not terrorists who are being sheltered in these states), always repre-
sents a violation of international law, inter alia, as a clear form of impermis-
sible intervention. Where no condition of war exists, such assassination 
would likely exhibit the crime of aggression and/or the crime of terrorism.52 
Regarding aggression, Article 1 of the Resolution on the Definition of Ag-
gression defines this crime, among other things, as: “[T]he use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.”53   
In view of the jus cogens norm of nonintervention54 codified in the 
U.N. Charter that would ordinarily be violated by transnational assassina-
tion, such killing would generally qualify as aggression. Assuming that 
transnational assassination constitutes an example of “armed force,” the 
criminalization, as aggression, of such activity, may also be extrapolated 
from Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression:  
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Secu-
rity Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determi-
  
Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“States have a duty to refrain 
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”). 
 52 See Jordan J. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide 
and Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 283, 299 (1986) (argu-
ing that the assassination of a political official is not, by itself, an act of terrorism, but be-
comes terroristic only where it is designed to “produce intense fear and anxiety”) [hereinafter 
Paust, Aggression Against Authority]; see also Jordan J. Paust, Response to Terrorism: A 
Prologue to Decision Concerning Private Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN J. INT’L STUD. 79, 
79 (1977) (stating that terrorism involves the intentional use of violence in order to “coerce 
the primary target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety and to serve a 
particular political end”); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of 
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and 
the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L.,191, 192–93 (1983) (“Terrorism is a form of 
violent strategy used to alter the freedom of choice of others.”). 
 53 Definition of Aggression, art. I, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/Res/29/3314 
(Dec. 14, 1974).  
 54 See generally U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 
1970); see also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).  
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nation that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified 
in the light of other relevant circumstances.
55
 
In the absence of belligerency, assassination of officials in one state 
upon the orders of another state might also be considered as terrorism.56 
Although it never entered into force, the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism57 warrants consideration and consultation.58 Inas-
  
 55 Definition of Aggression, supra note 53, art. 2. Article 2 stipulates that where the first 
use of force by a State is not “in contravention of the Charter” as determined by the Security 
Council, it could be construed as permissible or even as law-enforcing. In principle, such a 
determination might even concern assassination, although, as a practical matter, it is virtually 
inconceivable. 
 56 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167; see also Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 245, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/46 (Dec. 17, 1979); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 
1977, E.T.S. No. 90 (adopting a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as criminal). On 
December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemn-
ing all acts of terrorism as “criminal.” Never before had the General Assembly adopted such 
a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually 
constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-
taking and attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous 
custom and conventions. See G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/40/61, at 301 (Dec. 9, 1985); see also International Legal Instruments to Coun-
ter Terrorism, U.N. ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/terrorism/instru 
ments.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 57 In the 19th century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose crimes were "politi-
cal" was established in Europe and in Latin America. This principle is known as the "politi-
cal offense exception" to extradition. But a specific exemption from the protection of the 
political offense exception--in effect, an exception to the exception--was made for the assas-
sins of heads of state and for attempted regicides. At the 1937 Convention for the Prevention 
and Repression of Terrorism, the murder of a head of state, or of any family member of a 
head of state, was formally designated as a criminal act of terrorism. Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 L.N.O.J. 23, League of Nations Doc 
C.456(I).M.383(I).1937.V (1938). The so-called attentat clause, which resulted from an 
attempt on the life of French Emperor Napoleon III, and later widened in response to the 
assassination of President James Garfield in the U.S., limited the political offense exception 
in international law to preserve social order. Murder of a head of state or members of the 
head of state's family was thus designated as a common crime, and this designation has been 
incorporated into Article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. Yet, we are 
always reminded of the fundamental and ancient right to tyrannicide, especially in the post-
Holocaust/post-Nuremberg world order. It follows that one could argue persuasively under 
international law that the right to tyrannicide is still overriding and that the specific prohibi-
tions in international treaties are not always binding. European Convention on Extradition, 
art. 3, Dec. 13, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24. 
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much as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, is 
normally taken as a convention on terrorism, its particular prohibitions on 
assassination are also relevant here. After defining “internationally protect-
ed person” at Article 1 of this Convention, Article 1 identifies as a crime, 
inter alia, “The intentional commission of (a) a murder, kidnapping or other 
attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person.”59  
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism rein-
forces the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons. According to Article 1(c) of this Conven-
tion, one of the constituent crimes of terror violence is “a serious offense 
involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of interna-
tionally protected persons, including diplomatic agents.” And, according to 
Article 1(e), another constituent terrorist crime is “an offense involving the 
use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if 
this use endangers persons.”60  
III. ASSASSINATION DURING A CONDITION OF WAR 
When a state of war exists between states, transnational assassina-
tion is normally considered a war crime. According to Article 23(b) of the 
Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907, respect-
ing the laws and customs of war on land: “It is especially forbidden . . . to 
kill or wound treacherously, individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army.” U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), 
which has incorporated this prohibition, authoritatively links Hague Article 
23(b) to assassination at Paragraph 31: “This article is construed as prohibit-
ing assassination, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price 
upon an enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy “dead or 
alive.”61 Whether or not a particular state has followed a comparable form 
of incorporation, it is still certainly bound by the Hague codification, and by 
the 1945 Nuremberg Judgment that the rules found in The Hague Regula-
tions had entered into customary international law as of 1939.62 
  
 58 See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note 57. 
 59 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, art. 2, Dec. 14, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167.  
 60 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, E.T.S. 90. 
 61 See Hague Convention IV: Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539; See also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27–10, THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE, art. 31 app. A-10 (1976).  
 62 See U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(b) (1945) 
(“[I]nternational custom [is] evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”). In this con-
nection, the essential significance of a norm's customary character under international law is 
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There is, however, a contrary argument. Here, the position is of-
fered that enemy officials, as long as they are operating within the military 
chain of command,63 are authentic combatants, and not enemies hors de 
combat. It follows, by this reasoning (reasoning, incidentally, which was 
accepted widely with reference to the question of assassinating Saddam 
Hussein during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom), that 
certain enemy officials are lawful targets, and that assassination of enemy 
leaders is permissible so long as it displays respect for the pertinent laws of 
war. As for the prohibition codified at Art. 23(b) of Hague Convention IV 
(Hague), which is also part of customary international law, this contrary 
argument, in practice, has simply paid it no attention. 
In principle, adherents of the argument that assassination of enemy 
officials in wartime (traditionally, this means war between states) may be 
permissible could offer two possible bases of jurisprudential support: (1) 
they could argue that such assassination does not evidence behavior de-
signed “to kill or wound treacherously” (emphasis added) as defined at 
Hague Article 23(b); and/or (2) they could argue that there is a “higher” or 
jus cogens obligation to assassinate in particular circumstances that trans-
cends and overrides pertinent treaty prohibitions. To argue the first position 
would focus primarily on a “linguistic” solution; to argue the second would 
recall the preeminence of peremptory or jus cogens norms, and would likely 
return to the historic natural law origins of international law.64 
  
that the norms binds even those states that are not parties to the pertinent codifying instru-
ment or convention. Indeed, with respect to the bases of obligation under international law, 
even where a customary norm and a norm restated in treaty form are apparently identical, the 
norms are treated as separate and discrete. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 178 (June 27) (“Even if two norms 
belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the 
States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of 
customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence.”). Moreover, in many 
states, customary international law is binding and self-executing but an act of the legislature 
is required to transform conventional law into internal law.  
 63 See generally Yashimata v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (discussing the principle of com-
mand responsibility, or respondeat superior); 12 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM., THE GERMAN 
HIGH COMMAND TRIAL, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 71(1949) (applying the 
principle of command responsibility during the Nuremberg Trials); William H. Parks, Com-
mand Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973) (examining the degree of 
intent required for criminal responsibility under domestic and international law with respect 
to the principle of command responsibility); William V. O’Brien, The Law of War, Com-
mand Responsibility, and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L. J. 605 (1972) (applying the principle of com-
mand responsibility to incidents that occurred during the Vietnam War); U.S. DEPT. OF 
ARMY, ARMY REG. 27–1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES (1996) (explaining the principle 
of command responsibility).  
 64 The idea of Natural Law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right and 
justice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they are 
external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its at-
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But even if one or both of these positions could be argued persua-
sively, the conclusion, by definition, would have nothing to do with antici-
patory self-defense. Because assassination during wartime cannot be a 
measure of self-help short of war, its legality must be appraised solely ac-
cording to the settled laws of war. It follows that any assassination of enemy 
officials in another state may be a lawful instance of anticipatory self-
defense only in those cases in which the target person(s) represents states 
with which there is no recognized belligerency.65 
IV. ASSASSINATION AS LAW ENFORCEMENT AMONG STATES NOT AT WAR 
The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modern ori-
gins in the Caroline incident, an event which concerned the unsuccessful 
rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule (a rebellion that 
aroused sympathy and support in the American border states).66 Following 
this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally been taken to jus-
tify militarily defensive action. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between 
the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense, which did 
not require an actual attack. Here, military response to a threat was judged 
permissible so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leav-
ing no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”67 
  
tendant tradition of human civility run continuously from Mosaic Law and the ancient 
Greeks and Romans to the present day. See generally, Louis René Beres, Justice and Realpo-
litik: International Law and the Prevention of Genocide, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 123 (1988) (as-
sessing the natural law origins of international law).  
 65 The generic question of whether or not a state of war actually exists under international 
law can be ambiguous. Traditionally, a formal declaration of war was a necessary condition 
before “formal” war could be said to exist. See GROTIUS, supra note 27, at 97, 798 (1625) 
(dividing wars into declared wars, which were legal and undeclared wars, which were not). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains only after a conclu-
sive declaration of war by one of the parties, was codified by Hague Convention III. See 
Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, supra note 7, art. 1. Currently, a 
state of war may exist without formal declarations, but only if there is an armed conflict 
between two or more states and/or at least one of these states considers itself at war. Beres, 
On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 35, at 10 n.18. 
 66 The Caroline was an American steamboat accused of running arms to Canadian rebels. 
A Canadian military force crossed over into the United States and set the ship ablaze, killing 
an American citizen in the process. A Canadian was arrested in New York for the murder, 
and the British government protested. See 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 409–14 (1906) (recounting the history of the Caroline). 
 67 See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging 
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (1984) (noting that the Caroline 
case transformed the right to self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal 
doctrine). 
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Today, some scholars argue that the customary right of anticipatory 
self-defense articulated by the Caroline has been overridden by the specific 
language of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. In this view, Article 51 fashions 
a new, and far more restrictive, statement of self-defense, one that relies on 
the literal qualification contained at Article 51 “if an armed attack occurs.” 
Still, this interpretation ignores that international law cannot reasonably 
compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even lethal first strike 
before acting to protect itself. The argument against the restrictive view of 
self-defense is reinforced by the recurrent weaknesses of the U.N. Security 
Council in offering collective security against aggression, and, of course, by 
the September 20, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America. 
Whether or not assassination should ever qualify as law-enforcing 
anticipatory self-defense in a particular instance could be a largely subjec-
tive judgment, and may also be affected by municipal (domestic) law.68 
Before any state could persuasively argue any future instances of anticipa-
tory self-defense under international law, including assassination, the state 
would have to make a strong case that it had first sought to exhaust all 
peaceful means of settlement. Even a broad view of the doctrine of anticipa-
tory self-defense does not relieve a state of the obligations codified at Arti-
cle 1, and at Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter.  
These obligations notwithstanding, we must always return to the 
primary understanding that “international law is not a suicide pact,” espe-
cially in this age of uniquely destructive weaponry. The advent of the nucle-
ar and perhaps even post-nuclear age may make it a form of suicide for a 
state to wait for an actual act of aggression to occur. Recognizing this early 
on, Wolfgang Friedmann had argued insightfully even before today’s grow-
ing threat of “rogue states,” and of associated weapons of mass destruction: 
The judgment as to when to resort to such [preemptive] measures now 
places an almost unimaginable burden of responsibility upon the leaders of 
the major Powers. But while this immensely increases the necessity for a 
reliable international detection organization and mechanism, in the ab-
sence of effective international machinery the right of self-defense must 
probably now be extended to the defence against a clearly imminent ag-




In rather similar fashion, Myres McDougal argued: 
  
 68 See Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59552 (Dec. 4, 1981) (“No person 
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or con-
spire to engage in, assassination”) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)). 
 69 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259–60 
(1964). 
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The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon 
the customary right of self-defense have been, in conformity with the over-
riding policy it serves of minimizing coercion and violence across states 
lines, those of necessity and proportionality. The conditions of necessity 
required to be shown by the target state have never, however, been re-
stricted to “actual armed attack”; imminence of attack of such high degree 
as to preclude effective resort by the intended victim to non-violent modal-
ities of response has always been regarded as sufficient justification, and it 
is now generally recognized that a determination of imminence requires an 
appraisal of the total impact of an initiating state’s coercive activities upon 
the target state’s expectations about the costs of preserving its territorial 
integrity and political independence. Even the highly restrictive language 
of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case, specifying a “necessity 
of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation,” did not require “actual armed attack,” and the 
understanding is now widespread that a test formulated in the previous 
century for a controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to 




Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still 
left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, 
at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance 
of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of antic-
ipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness 
of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the 
enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemp-
tion. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually 
prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonable-
ness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-
enforcing behavior. 
For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would 
need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited 
to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospec-
tive attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all 
of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionali-
ty, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow 
intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to prepara-
tions for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within 
the intended victim’s state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be 
founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent 
the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm 
  
 70 Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 
597, 598 (1963) (citations omitted). 
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to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory 
self-defense. 
Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permit-
ting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the conven-
ient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of 
assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, 
compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could oth-
erwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible 
worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to 
assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a de-
centralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraor-
dinary methods of law-enforcement.71 
Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that 
another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its 
population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelli-
gence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, 
perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. 
Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action 
(assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the 
selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, 
and cost-effective. 
What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? 
Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker’s nu-
clear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove 
even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably 
depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the mo-
ment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are 
configured.  
But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of 
preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and 
possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination 
should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible 
form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. 
  
 71 Louis Rene Beres, On Assassination, Preemption, and Counterterrorism: The View 
from International Law, INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 694, 697 n.56 
(2008). 
These dynamics have their historical origins in the end of the Thirty Years War, 
and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. After the Peace, which consecrated the emer-
gence of the modern state system, international law began to rely essentially upon 
remedies of self-help. Even with the implementation of the League of Nations after 
World War I, and the United Nations after World War II, the dynamics of self-help 
remain jurisprudentially valid in existential circumstances.  
Id. 
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What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states 
would not involve higher-order (WMD)72 military attacks? Could assassina-
tion also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under 
these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer 
might still be “yes.” The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack 
may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by 
no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might 
still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive.73 Moreover, it 
could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks. 
V. ASSASSINATION AS ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM 
Acknowledging the importance and controversies surrounding the 
successful American assassination of Osama bin Laden, and also the con-
tinuing (perhaps even undiminished) threat from al-Qaeda and related jihadi 
74organizations, the principal hazard to be considered here is terrorism. 
More precisely, we must now inquire: “To what extent, if any, might assas-
sination represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense as a strat-
egy of counter-terrorism”?75 The answer will be contingent, inter alia, upon 
whether the intended victims represent (1) leaders of a state that sponsors or 
supports terrorism against the state considering assassination; and/or (2) 
terrorist leaders directly. 
Before any answer can be explored or offered, an antecedent ques-
tion must be addressed; a question that still baffles students of international 
  
 72 Normally, WMD refers to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The Project Daniel 
Group, however, excluded chemical weapons from this category. For a pertinent definition of 
WMD under US law see 50 U.S.C. § 2302 (1) (1996) (here, a “weapon of mass destruction” 
is defined as “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or 
impact of— (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or 
(C) radiation or radioactivity”).  
 73 This was, in fact, a major assumption of the Project Daniel Group. See Beres, Israel’s 
Strategic Future, supra note 11, at 2–3 (discussing “anticipatory self-defense under interna-
tional law”). 
 74 See generally THE LEGACY OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC HOLY WAR AND THE RISE OF NON-
MUSLIMS (Andrew G. Bostom ed., 2008) (providing a thorough analysis of jihad).  
 75 There is, of course, a distinct ironic quality to this question. This is because of the ar-
gument, offered earlier here, that assassination may be a form of terrorism in certain instanc-
es. See Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 52, at 283 (discussing assassination 
as terrorism); see also LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 411–12, 605 (Alona E. 
Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978) (discussing political terrorists, kidnapping and assassi-
nation of executives); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES 5, 57, 85–86, 125, 296, 329 (Yonah Alexander ed. 1976) (discussing examples 
of terrorist killings and kidnappings); TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 7–10, 
12, 32–36, 50–52, 66–67, 83, 94–98, 101, 109, 111, 188, 248, 292 (Yonah Alexander & 
Seymour Maxwell Finger eds., 1977) (examining ethical issues that terrorism presents). 
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relations and international law: “When is the ‘private’ use of force lawful, 
and when is it terrorism?” 
International law has consistently proscribed particular acts of in-
ternational terrorism.76 At the same time, however, it has codified the right 
of insurgents to use certain levels and types of force whenever fundamental 
human rights are being repressed, and where non-violent methods of redress 
are unavailable.77 Inhabiting, since 1648, a sovereignty-centered system 
  
 76 In the United States, implementing legislation reinforces these proscriptions. See Inter-
national Convention against the Taking of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984) (implemented by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984); see also Act to 
Implement the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 91–449, 84 Stat. 921 (1970); Act to Amend the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft; To Provide a More Effective Program to Prevent Aircraft Piracy; and for 
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 93–366, 88 Stat. 409 (1974); Act for the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Pub. L. No. 94–467, 90 Stat. 
1997 (1976); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–351, 96 Stat. 1663 (1982). There are several other pertinent U.S. 
legislation to control terrorism. See Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official 
Guests of the United States, Pub. L. No. 92–539, 86 Stat. 1070–1073 (1972); National Emer-
gencies Act, As Amended, Pub. L. No. 94–412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); Federal Income Tax 
Forgiveness for U.S. Military and Civilian Employees Killed Overseas, Pub. L. No. 98–259, 
98 Stat. 142 (1984); Achillo Lauro Hijackers and Other Terrorists: Demand for Apprehen-
sion, Prosecution and Punishment, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985); Continuing 
appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99–591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986).  
 77 Although specially-constituted U.N. committees and the U.N. General Assembly have 
repeatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive 
from “the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colo-
nial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of their strug-
gle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United 
Nations.” Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 35. Article 7 of 
the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression corroborates this exemption from the 
1973 General Assembly Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. Id.; 
see also Rep. of the Special Comm. on Int’l Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973); G.A. Res. 
3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974), reprinted in 
13 I.L.M. 710 (1974); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) (regarding the October 24, 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States to which Article 7 refers); Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: 
Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev.1 (1981) (by Aureliu Cristescu) (providing comprehensive and au-
thoritative inventory of sources of international law concerning the right to use force on 
behalf of self-determination); Malvina Halberstam, The Evolution of the United Nations 
Position on Terrorism: From Exempting National Liberation Movements to Criminalizing 
Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever Committed, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 573, 573–
84 (2003).  
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wherein the normative rules of the human rights regime are normally not 
enforceable by central global institutions,78 the individual victims of human 
rights abuse must obtain relief in appropriate forms of humanitarian assis-
tance via intervention by sympathetic states and/or in approved forms of 
rebellion. Without such self-help remedies, the extant protection of human 
rights in a decentralized or “Westphalian” legal setting would be entirely a 
fiction, assuring little more than the unwelcome primacy of realpolitik.79 
The origins of the current human rights regime—which is high-
lighted by the U.N. Charter; the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1976)—lie in ancient Greece and Rome. From Greek Stoicism and 
Roman law to the present, the jus gentium (law of nations) and modern in-
ternational law have generally accepted the right of individuals to overthrow 
tyrants and to oppose, forcefully if necessary, tyrannical regimes. This ac-
ceptance can be found primarily in international custom, the general princi-
ples of law recognized by nations, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, var-
ious judicial decisions, specific compacts and documents (e.g., the Magna 
Carta,80 1215; the Petition of Right,81 1628; the English Bill of Rights,82 
  
 78 This is sometimes referred to as the “Westphalian System,” after the Peace of Westpha-
lia in 1648 ended the Thirty Years War. See Treaty of Peace of Munster, Fr.–Holy Roman 
Empire, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; see also Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Holy 
Roman Empire–Swed., Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 12.  
 79 Building upon Plato’s theory of ideas, which sought to elevate “nature” from the sphere 
of contingent facts to the realm of immutable archetypes or “forms,” Aristotle, in his Ethics, 
advanced a concept of “natural justice.” See R.W. BROWNE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF 
ARISTOTLE 134–37 (1853). Quoting Antigone, he argued, “an unjust law is not a law.” Id. 
This position stands in stark contrast to the Realpolitik opinion of the Sophists that justice is 
never more than an expression of de facto supremacy, that it is what Thrasymachus calls, in 
Plato’s Republic, “the interest of the stronger.” See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC: THRASYMACHUS 
(B. Jowett trans., 1875). “Justice is a contract neither to do nor to suffer wrong,” says Glau-
con. Id.; see also CICERO, supra note 15, at 191.  
 80 Magna Carta, issued in the year 1215, marks a vitally important first step toward consti-
tutional authority and the subjection of kings to parliamentary will. See generally WILLIAM 
SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 
(2d ed. 1914) (providing an accurate account of the original versions of the Charter in addi-
tion to later editions and commentaries). 
 81 The Petition of Right, 1628, H.C. Bill (Eng. and Wales), reprinted in ARTHUR E. 
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 68–71 (1965). The Petition of Right (1628), 
in the fashion of THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), begins with a lengthy 
recitation of grievances stemming from royal abuse. Acknowledging the Magna Carta, it 
condemns forced loans (identifying unlawful imprisonments arising in the course of such 
exactions), complains of the failure to discharge men from unjust imprisonment on habeas 
corpus, and, inter alia, opposes the billeting of soldiers among the people against their will. 
The King’s initial response on June 2, 1628, to the Petition of Right was evasive, but on June 
7, 1628, he gave his Royal assent. Id. 
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1689; the Declaration of Independence, 1776; the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, 831789), the writings of “highly-qualified publi-
cists” (e.g., Cicero; Francisco de Vitoria; Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de 
Vattel84) and, by extrapolation, from the critical convergence of human 
rights law with the absence of any effective, authoritative central institutions 
in Westphalian world law and politics. 
This brings us to the first authoritative jurisprudential standard for 
differentiating between lawful insurgency and terrorism, one commonly 
known as “just cause.”85 Where individual states prevent or impair the exer-
cise of basic human rights, an anti-regime insurgency may express law-
enforcing reactions under international law. For this to be the case, howev-
er, the means used in that insurgency must also be consistent with the se-
cond authoritative jurisprudential standard, commonly known as “just 
means.”86 
  
 82 SUTHERLAND, supra note 81, at 91–97. 
 83 HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744–45 (Albert P. Blaustein, Roger S. Clark and Jay A. 
Sigler, eds., 1st ed. 1987). LA DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN [THE 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN] (1789) (Fr.), which preceded and 
became a part of the French constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795, is substantially more 
sweeping than the American Bill of Rights. LA CONST. (1791) (Fr.); LA CONST. (1793) (Fr.); 
LA CONST. (1795) (Fr.). Lafayette, one of the drafters of the French Declaration, was in 
America at the time of The Declaration of Independence and was a friend of its principal 
author, Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 743. Its substance may be taken as an essential source of the 
current human rights regime under authoritative international law. 
 84 Vattel also takes a strong position in support of anticipatory self-defense: “The safest 
plan is to prevent evil where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the injury anoth-
er seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance against 
the aggressor.” EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution 1916) (1758), re-
printed in 4 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1983).  
 85 See Malvina Halberstam, The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: 
From Exempting National Liberation Movements to Criminalizing Terrorism Wherever and 
by Whomever Committed, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 573, 574–84 (2003) (clarifying im-
portant points regarding what constitutes “just cause,” particularly focusing on the differ-
ences between the struggle for self-determination and terrorism). More generally, the princi-
ple of “just cause” maintains that a particular insurgency may exercise law-enforcing 
measures under international law. This argument is deducible from the existence of an au-
thoritative human rights regime in international law, and from the corollary absence of any 
central enforcement mechanism to support this regime, codified in several U.N. documents. 
See Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee on Int’l Terrorism, 28th Sess., July 16–August 11, 1973, 
U.N. Doc. A/9028; GAOR, Supp. No. 28 (1973); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9619, art. 7 (Dec. 14, 1974) (referring 
to the October 24, 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States). 
 86 On the principle of “just means,” see Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 
539 [hereinafter The Hague Regulations]; see also Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
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In deciding whether any particular insurgency is an instance of ter-
rorism or law-enforcement, therefore, states must base their overall evalua-
tions, in part, on informed judgments concerning discrimination, propor-
tionality, and military necessity. Once force is applied broadly to any seg-
ment of human population, intentionally blurring the distinction between 
combatants and noncombatants, terrorism is plainly taking place.  Similarly, 
once force is applied to the fullest possible extent, restrained only by the 
limits of available weaponry, terrorism is incontestably underway. 
As an example, the intentionally indiscriminate use of force by Pal-
estinian insurgents against Israeli noncombatants is always terroristic. How-
ever one might seek to defend the justness of the Palestinian cause, there is, 
in law, simply no cause that can ever justify the premeditated murder of 
women and children in their schools, buses, hospitals or restaurants. 
Under international law, the legitimacy of a certain cause can never 
legitimize the use of certain forms of violence. Jurisprudentially, the ends 
can never justify the means. As in the case of war between states, every use 
of force by insurgents must always be judged twice; once with regard to the 
justness of the objective, and once with regard to the justness of the means 
used in pursuit of that objective. 
The explicit application of codified restrictions of the laws of war to 
non-international armed conflicts dates back only as far as the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. However, recalling that the laws of war, like the 
whole of international law, are comprised of more than treaties and conven-
tions, it is clear that the obligations of jus in bello (justice in war) are part of 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and are bind-
ing upon all categories of belligerents. The Hague Convention IV, of 1907, 
declares, in broad terms, that in the absence of a precisely published set of 
  
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17. The “more complete 
code” referred to in The Hague Regulations became available with the adoption of the four 
above 1949 Geneva Conventions. These agreements contain a common article (3) under 
which the convention provisions become applicable in non-international armed conflicts. 
Still, the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea that all of the laws of war 
should apply to internal conflicts and in 1970 the United Nations Secretary General request-
ed that additional rules relating to non-international armed conflicts be adopted in the form of 
a protocol or a separate convention. These rules were codified on June 8, 1977 when the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitari-
an Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949. U.N. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Protocol I]; U.N. Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
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guidelines in humanitarian international law concerning “unforeseen cases,” 
all belligerency is governed by the pre-conventional sources of international 
law: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High 
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included 
in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of na-
tions, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, 
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.
87
 
This “more complete code” did become available with the adoption 
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. These agreements contained a com-
mon article (3), under which the Convention provisions would be applicable 
in non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the 1949 Geneva Diplo-
matic Conference rejected the idea that all of the laws of war should apply 
to internal conflicts, and in 1970 the U.N. Secretary General requested that 
additional rules relating to non-international armed conflicts be adopted in 
the form of a protocol, or as a separate convention. 
In 1974, the Swiss government convened in Geneva the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Human-
itarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. On 8 June 1977, the Conference 
formally adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949. Protocol II relates “to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts,” and develops and supplements common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. Although, in the fashion of common 
Article 3 and Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, 
Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions 
such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of violence, it does apply to all 
armed conflicts, which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Par-
ty between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
Geneva Protocol I also constrains insurgent uses of force in “armed 
conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation, and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
  
 87 Hague Regulations supra note 86, pmbl. The Martens Clause, named after the Russian 
delegate at the first Hague Conferences, is included in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 
37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125 (1997). This Clause is designated a higher status in Protocol 1, 
where it is included in the main text at Article 1. Protocol I, supra note 86, art. 1. In Protocol 
2, the Martens Clause was again moved to the Preamble. Protocol II, supra note 86, pmbl. 
The core jurisprudential effect of the Martens Clause is to extend the law of armed conflict to 
all types of liberation war. 
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determination.” Thus, even where the peremptory rights to self-
determination are being exercised, insurgent forces must resort to lawful 
means of combat. According to Article 35, which reaffirms longstanding 
norms of international law: “In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to 
the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.” 
States also have an obligation to treat captured insurgents in con-
formity with the basic dictates of international law. Although this obligation 
does not normally interfere with a state’s right to regard as common or ordi-
nary criminals those persons not engaged in armed conflict (that is, persons 
involved merely in internal disturbances, riots, isolated and specific acts of 
violence, or other acts of a similar nature), it does mean that all other cap-
tives remain under the protection and authority of international law. 
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict, it 
may mean an additional obligation of states to extend the privileged status 
of prisoner of war (POW) to such persons. Significantly, this additional 
obligation is unaffected by insurgent respect or lack of respect for the laws 
of war of international law. While all combatants are obliged to comply 
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of 
these rules do not automatically deprive an insurgent combatant of his or 
her right to protection equivalent in all respects to that accorded to prisoners 
of war. This right, codified by the Geneva Conventions, is now comple-
mented and enlarged by the two protocols to those Conventions.88 
These norms notwithstanding, we return again to the essential prin-
ciple that international law is not a suicide pact, and that the jus cogens89 
right to ward off annihilation may countenance assassination in certain re-
sidual instances as permissible anticipatory self-defense against terrorism. 
Just as states may have the right to resort to assassination as a method of 
preempting overwhelming harm threatened by other states, so may they 
reserve this right when confronted with the serious threat of international 
terrorism. Such reservation will become even more reasonable to the extent 
that an expected threat of terrorism is of a WMD (e.g., chemi-
cal/nuclear/biological) nature. Recognizing this, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America had affirmed clearly: “Our priority 
will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and 
  
 88 Protocol I, supra note 86, art. 44 (stating that combatants are entitled to the rights of 
prisoners of war). In this connection, and in particular reference to Protocol I, insurgent 
combatants captured after launching direct attacks upon innocent civilians should continue to 
be treated as prisoners of war, but may be prosecuted for the commission of war crimes. Id. 
art. 85 (stating that “launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or 
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects . . . .” would be a grave breach of the Geneva conven-
tions, and that “grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.”).  
 89 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, art. 53. 
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attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material 
support; and finances.” 
After the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we must, in as-
sessing assassination as a permissible form of preemption against terrorism, 
recognize that the prospective targets of assassination may be not only ter-
rorists themselves, but also officials of states that support terrorism. From 
the point of view of international law, we must now ask, “Is there a differ-
ence?” Are individual officials of states that sponsor or sustain terrorism 
against other states legitimate objects of transnational assassination?  
This question, of course, is exceedingly complex, involving, among 
other difficult issues, the matter of the lawfulness of the pertinent insurgen-
cy. Although state sponsorship of insurgencies in other states may be lawful 
as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of human rights, such 
sponsorship is patently unlawful whenever its rationale lies solely in pre-
sumptions of geopolitical advantage. Now the long-standing customary pro-
hibition against foreign support for lawless insurgencies is codified in the 
U.N. Charter, and also in the authoritative interpretation of that multilateral 
treaty at article 1, and at article 3(g) of the General Assembly’s 1974 Defi-
nition of Aggression. 
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states 
are built upon an assumption that all states must normally defend against 
aggression.90 Hersch Lauterpacht expressed this peremptory principle. Ac-
cording to Lauterpacht, the following rule concerns the scope of state re-
sponsibility for preventing acts of insurgency or terrorism against other 
states:  
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining persons 
within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities against 
friendly States as amount to organized acts of force in the form of hostile 
expeditions against the territory of those States. It also obliges the States to 
  
 90 See generally CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, supra note 29, GROTIUS, supra note 15; EMMERICH 
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., 1852) (1758). The presumption of 
solidarity between states in the fight against crime gives rise to the increasingly important 
principle of universal jurisdiction. The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened 
whenever extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting 
Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the 
infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
supra note 86; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 86; Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, supra note 86; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17. 
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repress and discourage activities in which attempts against the life of polit-
ical opponents are regarded as a proper means of revolutionary action.
91
 
Lauterpacht’s rule, which may ultimately prove relevant to as-
sessing Pakistan’s role in the possible sheltering of Osama bin laden, reaf-
firms the Resolution on the Rights and Duties of Foreign Powers as Regards 
the Established and Recognized Governments in Case of Insurrection 
adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900. His rule, however, 
stops short of the prescription offered by Emmerich de Vattel.92 According 
to Vattel’s THE LAW OF NATIONS, states that support terrorism directed at 
other states become the lawful prey of the world community:  
If, then, there is anywhere a nation of a restless and mischievous disposi-
tion, ever ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to excite 
domestic disturbances in their dominions,—it is not to be doubted that all 
others have a right to form a coalition in order to repress and chastise that 




 91 3 HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF PEACE 274 (Elihu Lauter-
pacht ed., 1977).  
 92 In the fashion of Grotius, Vattel draws upon ancient Hebrew Scripture and Jewish Law, 
although these norms refer more generally to inter-personal relations than to specifically 
inter-national relations. See Exodus 22:2n (King James) (demonstrating a provision of the 
Torah that exonerates from guilt a potential victim of robbery with possible violence if, in 
self-defense, he struck down and, if necessary, even killed the attacker before he committed 
any crime (emphasis added)). Additionally, one noted rabbi has stated: “If a man comes to 
slay you, forestall by slaying him.” Rashi: Sanhedrin 72a. Perhaps more closely analogous to 
anticipatory self-defense under international law is a decision in the Talmud that categorizes 
a war “to diminish the heathens so that they shall not march against them” as milhemet reshut 
or discretionary. See Sotah 44b.  
 93 DE VATTEL, supra note 90, at 154, § 53. A related issue here concerns “universal juris-
diction” over the individual terrorist criminals. Traditionally, piracy and slave-trading were 
the offenses warranting universal jurisdiction. Following World War II, however, states have 
generally acknowledged an expansion of universal jurisdiction to include the following: 
crimes of war; crimes against peace; crimes against humanity; hostage-taking; crimes against 
internationally-protected persons; hijacking; sabotage of aircraft; torture; genocide; and 
apartheid. For the most part, this jurisdictional expansion has its roots in various multilateral 
conventions, customary international law and certain pertinent judicial decisions. See Filarti-
ga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he torturer has become, like the 
pirate and slave-trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); United 
States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“[N]ations have begun to extend 
[universal jurisdiction] to . . . crimes considered in the modern era to be as great a threat to 
the well-being of the international community as piracy . . . .”); Demjanjuk v. Petrovksy, 776 
F. 2d 571, 582–83 (6th Cir. 1985) (recognizing universal jurisdiction over war crimes, spe-
cifically a case involving extradition of a Ukrainian Nazi to Israel). For other judicial expres-
sions of universal jurisdiction, see United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, (D.D.C. 1988) 
(allowing jurisdiction in a case involving terrorist acts allegedly committed by a Lebanese 
national), rev’d, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (involving extradition of a Ukrainian Nazi to Israel); Von 
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Vattel extends the principle of Hostes humani generis94 from indi-
viduals to states (“nations”), even insisting that collective wrongdoers be 
dealt with just as harshly as individual criminals: 
Nations which are always ready to take up arms when they hope to gain 
something thereby are unjust plunderers; but those who appear to relish the 
horrors of war, who wage it on all sides without reason or pretext, and 
even without other motive than their savage inclinations, are monsters, 
unworthy of the name of men. They should be regarded as enemies of the 
human race, just as in civil society persons who follow murder and arson 
as a profession commit a crime not only against the individuals who are 
victims of their lawlessness, but against the State of which they are the de-
clared enemies. Other Nations are justified in uniting together as a body, 




But what, precisely, are the proper jurisprudential boundaries of this 
“right?” Do they include assassination? And if they do, would the resort to 
assassination be a permissible instance of anticipatory self-defense? 
Significantly, as we have already noted, the right of tyrannicide is 
long and well established in political philosophy and international law. This 
right may extend even to state-sponsored tyrannicide, or to transnational 
assassination as a form of humanitarian intervention. This is the case, for 
  
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating 
that universal jurisdiction may be exercised against criminal violations as well as civil viola-
tions), rev’d, 736 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); see also, PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION (2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf. 
There remains now the one question concerning an honorable cause for waging 
war . . . which is undertaken for no private reason of our own, but for the common 
interest, and in behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin against the laws of 
nature, and of mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may check such men by 
force of arms. 
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (John Carew Rolfe trans., 1933) (1612), re-
printed in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1983) 
 94 The concept of Hostes humani generis tends to obscure the fact that a great deal of 
human evil is ordinary or banal. In other words, a great many “normal” human beings can be 
expected to act “abnormally” in certain circumstances. Rather pessimistically, the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant once remarked: “Out of timber so crooked as that from which 
man is made, nothing entirely straight can be built.” The original German is: “Aus so 
krummem Holze, als voraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts Gerades gezimmert war-
den.” See IMMANUEL KANT, IDEE ZU EINER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHICHTE IN WELTBÜRGERLICHER 
ABSICHT [IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN VIEWPOINT], in 2 
DEUTSCHE MEISTERWERKE IN ARABISCHER ÜBERSETZUNG (1784); IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR 
A UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN VIEWPOINT (L.W. Beck ed., L.W. Beck et al. 
trans., 1957), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITION 
(Robert C. Scharff & Val Dusek, eds., 2003).  
 95 DE VATTEL, supra note 84, at 245–46, § 34.  
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example, wherever such a use of force is not directed against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state, but rather to assure per-
emptory human rights and/or self-determination within such a state. 
Recalling that an individual state’s right to self-defense is also per-
emptory under international law, it would appear that where assassination is 
not undertaken against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
another state, but only to further its own self-defense, it may be permissible. 
Of course, where we are concerned with anticipatory self-defense in particu-
lar, assassination would have to be consistent, in part, with the tests set forth 
by the Caroline, and in part by the broadened criteria identified in 2002 by 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Moreover, 
it would have to follow a determination that assassination was the least gen-
erally injurious form of anticipatory self-defense, and also the proper ex-
haustion of all possible means of pacific settlement. 
VI. THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO A NUCLEARIZNG IRAN 
There is arguably no more serious and ongoing security problem for 
the U.S. and the West generally than Iran.96 With its steady and illegal 
march toward full nuclear weapons capacity, a march that has been effec-
tively unhindered by U.N. sanctions, this primary state sponsor of jihadist 
terrorism represents genuinely existential threats on several fronts. For Isra-
el, in particular, a nuclear Iran portends nuclear-armed proxies in both Leb-





 96 For early warnings on Iran by this author, see Louis René Beres, Israel, Iran and Nucle-
ar War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1996); Louis 
René Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the Least Unattractive Option Under 
International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 187 (1996); Louis René Beres, Israel, Iran and Pro-
spects for Nuclear War in the Middle East, 21 STRATEGIC REV. 52 (1993); Louis René Beres, 
The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, 9 INT’L. J. INTELLIGENCE & 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 51 (1996); Louis René Beres & John T. Chain, Deterrent and De-
fense Against a Nuclear Iran, HAARETZ.COM (JUNE 27, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/features/deterrent-and-defense-against-a-nuclear-iran-1.369769; Louis René Beres & 
Isaac Ben-Israel, Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Threat, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 24, 
2008), http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=33503 (accessed by 
searching the archival index); Louis René Beres & John T. Chain, Israel’s Options for Deal-
ing with a Nuclear Iran, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT (June 17, 2011), http://www. us-
news.com/opinion/articles/2011/06/17/israels-options-for-dealing-with-a-nuclear-iran; Louis 
René Beres & John T. Chain, Nuclear Deterrence and Enemy Rationality, JERUSALEM POST, 
Aug. 7, 2011, at 14 (discussing early warnings about Iran). 
 97 In Gaza, the primary danger to Israel and the United States is from an Iran-supported 
Hamas. Here it is instructive to consider the still-unrevised Charter of Hamas, The Platform 
of the Islamic Resistance Movement:  
Peace initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences 
to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Re-
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It was primarily with the Iranian nuclear problem in mind that I in-
augurated Project Daniel in 2002. A private group comprised of four Israe-
lis and two Americans,99 Project Daniel presented its final report to former 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, by hand, on January 16, 2003. After a 
brief period of prudent confidentiality, this report, Israel’s Strategic Future, 
  
sistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of 
the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, 
the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the ban-
ner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad…There is no solution to 
the Palestinian problem except by Jihad . . . . We must imprint on the minds of 
generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one, to be dealt 
with on this premise . . . . I swear by that [sic] who holds in His hands the soul of 
Muhammad! I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and 
kill; assault and kill; assault and kill. 
The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 2 ISR. 
AFF. 273, arts. 13–15 (Raphael Israeli trans.) (1995) [hereinafter The Charter of Allah]. Ha-
mas is the acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement—Harakat Muqawama Islamiyaa—
meaning, literally, “enthusiasm,” “zeal,” and “fanaticism.” Hamas, COUNCIL ON FOR. REL., 
available at http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968 (last updated Oct. 20, 2011); Regarding 
its relationship to the Palestinians Authority (PA) and the underlying PLO, the Charter states 
unambiguously:  
The PLO is among the closest to the Hamas, for it constitutes a father, brother, rel-
ative, friend. Can a Muslim turn away from his father, his brother, his relatives or 
his friend? Our homeland is one, our calamity is one, our destiny is one and our 
enemy is common to both of us. 
The Charter of Allah, supra, art. 28. On the primacy of Hamas hatred toward Judaism, not 
Israel, the Charter states clearly: Israel by virtue of its being Jewish, and of having a Jewish 
population, defies Islam and the Muslims. “Let the eyes of the cowards not fall asleep.” Id.  
 98 For earlier writings by this author on Israel nuclear strategy, see Louis René Beres & 
Zeev Maoz, Correspondence: Israel and the Bomb, 29 INT’L SECURITY 175 (2004); Louis 
René Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq 
Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 437 (1995); Louis René Beres, The Bomb in the 
Basement, NATIV ONLINE, http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/issue1/beres-1.htm 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012); Nuclear Deterrence Now – To the Attention of a Busy PM (II), 
NATIV ONLINE, http://www.acpr.org.il/nativ_e/084-nativ-toc.htm#Nuclear Deterrence Now 
- To the Attention of a Busy PM (II) (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); Louis René Beres & Yoash 
Tsiddon-Chatto, In Support of Anticipatory Self-Defense: Israel, Osiraq and International 
Law, 19 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POL’Y 111 (1998); Israel’s Nuclear Strategy Ambiguity: 
Disclosure Doctrine, 26 DENVER J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y 209 (1998); Louis René Beres, Lim-
its of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope, 23 
ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 539 (1997); Louis René Beres, Where the Shadow Really Falls: 
Why Israel Must Have Nuclear Weapons, 4 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 127 (1997); Louis René 
Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Jurisdictional Assessment, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1996); Louis René Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the 
Lease Unattractive Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT’L LAW 186 (1996); 
Louis René Beres, The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, 9 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 51 (discussing Israel’s nuclear strategy issues). 
 99 See Beres, Israel’s Strategic Future, supra note 11.  
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was published by the Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel) in May 
2004.100 
The Iran problem brings to mind far broader legal issues of preemp-
tion and anticipatory self-defense. With regard to the still-growing prospect 
of a fully nuclear Iran, the assassination remedy would inevitably be inade-
quate. In this connection, Project Daniel acknowledged the stark limitations 
for Israel of ballistic missile defense (primarily, the “Arrow”), even where 
such measures continue to produce successful test results.  
The Arrow is necessary for Israeli security and survival, but it is al-
so not sufficient. To achieve a maximum level of needed security, Israel 
must also take appropriate and coordinated preparations for preemption and 
improved deterrence. Moreover, ballistic missile defense will do nothing to 
thwart terrorist surrogates of Iran who could utilize ordinary ships, cars or 
trucks as nuclear delivery vehicles. Finally, in the particular case of Israel 
and Iran, it is likely that the former has already resorted to various forms of 
cyber-defense and cyber-war. There are already available new and interest-
ingly non-explosive forms of anticipatory self-defense. 
International law is not a suicide pact.101 Together with the United 
States and other Western countries, Israel now exists in the determined 
cross hairs of jihad,102 and Iran will not conform to the normal civilizational 
  
100 See id. 
101 See PUFENDORF, supra note 16, at 50. 
Where it is quite clear that he is engaged in planning violence against me, even 
though he has not fully revealed his design, I shall be justified in immediately initi-
ating self-defence by force, and in seizing the initiative against him while he is still 
making preparations, if there is really no hope that a friendly warning would in-
duce him to drop his hostile design, or if such a warning would damage my own 
position. Hence the aggressor will be taken to be the party which first conceived 
the intention to harm the other and prepared himself to achieve it; but the goodwill 
of being a defender will go to him who by moving quickly got the better of an op-
ponent who was rather slow to get ready. For to have the name of defender it is not 
necessary to suffer the first blow or merely to elude and repel the blows aimed at 
one. 
Id. 
102 ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED 227 (1991) (noting that 
Jihad has for its followers determined that “peace with Israel was and still remains nothing 
less than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a symptom of its profound malaise, 
weakness and decadence.”); id. at 230 (“Mohammed, so it was reported, on the authority of 
Abu Huraira, had stated: ‘The hour [i.e. salvation] would not come until you fight against the 
Jews; and the stone would say, ‘O Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill 
him.’’”). Historically, the idea of “holy war” is by no means restricted to Islam. Even leaving 
aside various Old Testament imperatives and the Christian Crusade, the German philosopher, 
Hegel, reveals a widely-held notion that modern states represent, “the march of God in the 
world.” G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 197 (S.W. Dyde trans., 2001); see also 1 
HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE, POLITICS 15 (Blanche Dugdale & Torben de Bille trans., 1916) 
(stating, “Individual man sees in his country, the realization of his earthly immortality.”). 
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expectations of peace and justice. Left alone to complete its planned nucle-
arization, Iran could proceed to share certain of its atomic munitions with 
assorted terrorist proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Gaza, Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq.  
Ballistic missile defense is indispensable for Israel (primarily as an 
enhancement to deterrence, 103and as a limited form of “hard target” protec-
tion), but it may also still be critical for both Jerusalem and Washington, 
even after the Stuxnet virus, that Iran’s nuclear infrastructures be destroyed 
physically, and at their source.104 
The observance of justice between nations should always be our 
goal,105 but at the same time, we need to remain mindful of the clear disre-
  
103 Louis René Beres & John T. Chain, Nuclear Deterrence and Enemy Rationality, 
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 7, 2011 at 14. Here we argued that all forms of ballistic missile de-
fense will ultimately have “leakage,” and that the “principal benefit [of Israel’s Arrow sys-
tem] must . . . lie in enhanced deterrence . . . .” and not in any added increments of “soft-
point” (city) protection. Id. “[A] newly-nuclear Iran, [assuming rationality], would require 
steadily increasing numbers of offensive missiles in order to achieve a sufficiently destruc-
tive first-strike capability [against Israel].” Id. In principle, however, “there could come a 
time when Iran will be able to deploy more than a small number of nuclear-tipped missiles,” 
a circumstance wherein “Arrow, Iron Dome, and potentially, Magic Wand, could cease their 
prior enhancements of Israeli nuclear deterrence.” Id.  
104 See Louis René Beres & Thomas McInerney, Preemption Option: A Must for Israel, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 27, 2007, at 9; see also Louis René Beres & Isaac Ben-Israel, 
Ballistic Missile Defense and WMD, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2007/mar/18/2007 0318-094754-6839r/?page=all. 
105 Emmerich de Vattel offers a pertinent argument on the observance of justice between 
nations:  
Justice is the foundation of all social life and the secure bond of all civil inter-
course. Human society, instead of being an interchange of friendly assistance, 
would be no more than a vast system of robbery if no respect were shown for the 
virtue which gives to each his own. Its observance is even more necessary between 
Nations than between individuals, because injustice between Nations may be fol-
lowed by the terrible consequences involved in an affray between powerful politi-
cal bodies, and because is it more difficult to obtain redress. It is easy to prove 
from the natural law that all men are under the obligation to be just. We presume 
here that the obligation is sufficiently understood, and we limited ourselves to the 
observation that not only are Nations not exempt from it but it is even more sacred 
with respect to them because of the importance of its effects.  
Hence there is a strict obligation upon all Nations to promote justice among them-
selves, to observe it scrupulously in their own conduct, and to refrain carefully 
from any violation of it. Each should render to the others what belongs to them, re-
spect their rights, and leave them in the peaceful enjoyment of them.  
It follows from this indispensable obligation which nature imposes upon itself, that 
every State has the right to resist any attempt to deprive it of its rights, or of any-
thing which lawfully belongs to it; for in so doing it is only acting in conformity 
with all its duties, which is the source of its right.  
DE VATTEL, supra note 84, at 135, §§ 63–65. 
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gard for such observance among our many civilizational enemies. “The 
blood-dimmed tide is loosed,” observed the poet Yeats, “and everywhere, 
the ceremony of innocence is drowned.”106 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the associated war on terror, 
are not narrowly tactical conflicts. None will ultimately yield to purely op-
erational solutions. Rather, we are likely embroiled in a distinct clash of 
civilizations;107 to actually prevail in such a contest will require much more 
far-reaching kinds of strategic and jurisprudential understanding.  
We are bound to take seriously the rules and procedures of interna-
tional law, including the law of armed conflict, but we must also bear in 
mind that our enemies are generally unmindful of these same obligations. It 
follows that even assassination and other broader forms of preemption may 
sometimes be not only permissible under international law, but also alto-
gether indispensable.108 Conversely, there are occasions when any such 
strategies may be entirely legal, yet still ineffectual. 
  
106 W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 215 (1933) 
(illustrating the poet’s implicit awareness of the harms that arise whenever the individual is 
drowned by the “herd.”) Consider here, the German philosopher Nietsche’s observation: “To 
allure many from the herd—for that purpose have I come. The people and the herd must be 
angry with me: a robber shall Zarathustra be called by the herdsmen.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 
THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 19–20 (Thomas Common trans., 1946). Later, perhaps, borrow-
ing from Nietzsche, Freud spoke of the “primal horde.” SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 13 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1959); see 
also CARL G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION (1938). The Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung 
observed, in a very similar spirit:  
But if, on the other hand, people crowd together and form a mob, then the dynam-
ics of the collective man are set free—beasts or demons which lie dormant in every 
person till he is part of a mob. Man in the crowd is unconsciously lowered to an in-
ferior moral and intellectual level, to that level which is always there, below the 
threshold of consciousness, ready to break forth as soon as it is stimulated through 
the formation of a crowd.  
Id. at 15–16. 
107 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996); It is essential that we recall, always, the precisely end-
of-the-world imagery and eschatology of our enemies in that part of the world. For these 
enemies, the necessarily violent struggle against an ‘infidel’ and ‘apostate’ world represents 
a distinctly apocalyptic conflict. Id. For these enemies, the words of the French playwright, 
Giraudoux, would (perhaps ironically) have a special resonance: “C’est beau, n’est-ce pas, la 
fin du monde?” (It is beautiful, is it not, the end of the world?) JEAN GIRAUDOUX, SODOME ET 
GOMORRHE 96 (1951). 
108 See DE VATTEL, supra note 84, at 93, §233. In dealing with terrorists, an early jurisdic-
tional observation by Emmerich de Vattel remains valid:  
[W]hile the jurisdiction of each State is in general limited to punishing crimes 
committed in its territory, an exception must be made against those criminals who, 
by the character and frequency of their crimes, are a menace to public security eve-
rywhere and proclaim themselves enemies of the whole human race. Men who by 
profession are poisoners, assassins, or incendiaries may be exterminated wherever 
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Deception can be an essential and acceptable virtue in warfare, but 
there is always a jurisprudentially meaningful distinction between deception 
or ruses (stratagems or Kriegslist) and “perfidy.”109 The Hague Regulations 
in the Laws of War allow “ruses,”110 but disallow “treachery.” Permissible 
ruses include such practices as the use of camouflage, decoys, mock opera-
tions and ambush. False signals, too, are allowed—as an example, the jam-
ming of communications. Perfidy, on the other hand, includes such treach-
erous practices as improper use of the white flag, feigned surrender, or pre-
tending to have civilian status. 
Our system of international law is still founded upon the curious as-
sumption of a ubiquitous human Reason, and that this Reason will inevita-
bly guide our confused species toward correct behavior, and to a rejection of 
violent solutions.111 
Reason lies at the very heart of international law, yet it is almost 
nowhere to be found, certainly not among our current civilizational enemies 
who operate within the framework of jihad. Satisfying the universal wish to 
remain unaware of one’s own subconscious, seekers of a viable system of 
international law enforcement are still too often imprisoned by the idée fixe 
of an idealized humanity. Before this difficulty can be overcome, we must 
first understand international law in very different terms. At a minimum, we 
ought to recognize that such law must always operate within a world in 
which Reason may often have to submit to pure irrationality and barba-
rism,112 and where, alas, idyllic visions of human oneness, or cosmopolis, 
  
they are caught; for they direct their disastrous attacks against all Nations, by de-
stroying the foundations of their common safety.  
Id. Significantly, Vattel extended the principle of “enemies of the human race” from individ-
uals to states, and insisted that such collective wrongdoers be dealt with in exactly the same 
fashion. See supra text accompanying note 95.  
109 See Protocol I, supra note 86, art. 37.  
110 See Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its An-
nex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 24, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 129, 129–53 (1907) [hereinafter Conven-
tion II]. 
111 See Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground 103 (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans., 
1961).  
[M]an, always and everywhere, prefers to act in the way he feels like acting, and 
not in the way his reason and interest tell him, for it is very possible for a man to 
feel like acting against his interests and, in some instances, I say that he positively 
wants to act that way—but that’s my personal opinion. 
Id. 
112 JUNG, supra note 106, at 17 (“[H]ow impotent human reason and intellect are against the 
most palpable nonsense.”). 
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are routinely overwhelmed by sustained eruptions of fragmentation, sectari-
an killing, and disunity.113 
All international law moves more-or-less conspicuously in the 
midst of death,114 and carefully crafted visions of death are absolutely cen-
tral to the lives of our civilizational enemies. For these particular enemies, 
animating visions of jihad represent the metaphysical beginning of individ-
ual and collective martyrdom, and point conclusively toward the presump-
tively inevitable triumph of “one true faith” over all others. Once this zero-
sum view is finally understood, and as a genuinely indispensable under-
standing, we could then confront our genocidal115 enemies with more than 
narrow military responses,116 and also proceed to orient our emerging poli-
cies of preemption and anticipatory self-defense117 toward more comprehen-
sive and promising new directions. 
Article 38 of the U.N. Statute of the International Court of Justice 
makes explicit reference to “general principles of law recognized by civi-
  
113 “Where will it end? When will it all be lulled back into sleep, and cease, the bloody 
hatred, the destruction?” 1 THE COMPLETE AESCHYLUS: THE ORESTEIA 146 (Peter Burian & 
Alan Shapiro eds., 2nd ed. 2011) (presenting the ending of Agamemnon). 
114 It is instructive to recall the words of Eugene Ionesco: “People kill and are killed in 
order to prove to themselves that life exists.” See the dramatist’s only novel, EUGENE 
IONESCO, THE HERMIT 102 (Richard Seaver trans., 1973). 
115 Under international law, war and genocide need not be mutually exclusive. According 
to Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 
1951, genocide includes any of several acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.” See Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. II, III, Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1021, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
116 We must take special note of the following principle: Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium, 
ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium, meaning: “Where the ordinary remedy fails, recourse 
must be had to an extraordinary one.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990). 
117 It is especially important to note that our civilizational enemies’ recurrent resort to 
“human shields” and related forms of “perfidy” are a distinct violation of the rules of war—a 
violation that always renders them liable for any noncombatant harms. Convention II, supra 
note 110. If, for example, an essential preemptive attack against Iranian nuclear infrastruc-
tures were to cause injuries and fatalities to Iranian civilians because these assets had been 
deliberately placed in civilian areas, or because civilians had been purposely moved in prox-
imity to these assets, the full legal responsibility for pertinent noncombatant harms would fall 
upon Iran. As was explained earlier, deception can be legal under the law of armed conflict, 
but the Hague Regulations clearly disallow any placement of military assets or personnel in 
heavily populated civilian areas. See supra text accompanying notes 109–10. Further, prohi-
bition of perfidy is codified at Protocol 1 of 1977 and the fourth Geneva Convention. Proto-
col I, supra note 86, art. 37; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, art. 28. It is widely rec-
ognized that these rules are also binding on the basis of customary international law. Perfidy 
represents an especially serious violation of the law of war, one that is identified as a “Grave 
Breach” at article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Id. art 147. The incontestable legal 
effect of perfidy is always to immunize the preempting state from any unavoidable harms 
done to the perfidious party’s civilian populations.  
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lized nations.”118 The concept of “civilized nations” continues to make legal 
and geopolitical sense in the present world order. Each “civilized nation” 
has both the right and the obligation under international law to protect its 
citizens from terrorism, war and genocide.  
Should these nations ever surrender to perfidy in the current clash 
of civilizations, they would undermine this basic right and obligation. The 
net civilizational effect of any such capitulation would be to make absolute 
victors of the criminals and terrorists, a result that would doubtlessly in-
crease, rather than diminish, the overall number of noncombatant victims. It 
would also strengthen the resolve of all allied terrorist organizations in their 
interrelated and expanding war of chaos against the West. 
In any democratic state, the obligation of citizens to their govern-
ment is ultimately contingent upon that government’s assurance of protec-
tion.119 Many major legal theorists throughout history, especially Bodin, 
Leibniz and Hobbes, understood that the provision of security is always the 
first obligation of the state: “The obligation of subjects to the sovereign,” 
says Thomas Hobbes in Chapter XXI of LEVIATHAN, “is understood to last 
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect 
them.” It follows that our civilization’s obligation to oppose perfidy at every 
level (terrorism, war and genocide) now derives not only from international 
law, but also from each constituent state’s more general and immutable re-
quirement to protect its own citizens.120 
“[J]ust wars,” says Grotius, “arise from our love of the innocent.”121 
Now, even after the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the U.S. and its al-
lies are still in the midst of a stark civilizational struggle, and must continue 
to use all necessary and permissible means for national self-defense and 
collective self-preservation. Although perfidious provocations by various 
terror groups and enemy states may elicit reprisals that could bring assorted 
harms to noncombatants, it is always these provocations, not required de-
fensive responses, which would violate humanitarian international law. 
In the fashion of U.S. law,122 international law is based fundamen-
tally and immutably upon Natural Law.123 Natural Law makes it plain that 
  
118 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
T.S. No. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
119 According to Title II, Sec. 201(4) of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 
1995: “The President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military 
force, to disrupt, dismantle and destroy infrastructures used by international terrorists, includ-
ing terrorist training facilities, and safe havens.” The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995). 
120 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the French Treaties, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 422, 423 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
121 GROTIUS, supra note 15. 
122 Clinton Rossiter posits that the most compelling reason behind the admiration and honor 
given to the U.S. Constitution may be:  
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states have a peremptory, or jus cogens, obligation to protect their citizens, 
and to resist and punish crime. 
In his Opinion on the French Treaties, written on April 28, 1793, 
Thomas Jefferson states that when performance in international agreements 
“becomes impossible, non-performance is not immoral. So if performance 
becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules 
the laws of obligation to others.”124 In that same document, Jefferson wrote: 
“The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever its preservation [and] safe-
ty require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to its indispensable obli-
gations.”125  
None of this is to suggest that the U.S. and its allies are unsupported 
by pertinent elements of codified and customary international law in their 
essential counter-terrorism policies of preemption and anticipatory self-
defense, but only to underscore that these norms of positive jurisprudence 
are reinforced by Natural Law.126 
In 442 B.C.E., Sophocles articulated the idea of true law as an act of 
discovery, challenging the superiority of human rule-making in Antigone.127 
  
American’s deep-seated conviction that the Constitution is an expression of the 
Higher Law, that it is in fact imperfect man’s most perfect rendering of what 
Blackstone saluted as “the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the 
creator himself, in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human 
reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions.” 
Clinton Rossiter, Prefatory Note to EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vi (1928). 
123 The Fragments of Heraclitus attest to the antiquity of Natural Law. “For all human laws 
are nourished by the one divine law, which prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, 
and yet is something more than they.” THE PRESOCRATICS 75 (Phillip Wheelwright ed., 
1960). Even before Heraclitus, ancient Jewish Law was founded upon the revealed will of 
God as the only true normative source. In the Talmudic elucidation: “Whatever a competent 
scholar will yet derive from the law, that was already given to Moses on Mount Sinai.” 19 
CHICAGO STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF JUDAISM, THE TALMUD OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL 143 
(Jacob Neusner et al eds., Jacob Neusner trans., 1987). 
124 JEFFERSON, supra note 120, at 423. 
125 Id. at 429. 
126 Legal Positivism is a jurisprudential philosophy that values any state’s edicts as intrinsi-
cally just and obligatory. See JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 224–30 
(2d prtg. 1950). Stone calls positive jurisprudence, “the law actually enforced by organised 
society in a particular place at a particular time.” Id. at 225. Understood in terms of natural 
law, positive law is merely a necessary evil, tolerable and valid only to the extent that it 
coincides with Natural Law. In this theory, says Stone, “[n]ot only does Natural Law provide 
the criterion for judgment whether positive law is just. It goes further and provides the crite-
rion for deciding whether positive law is valid law at all.” Id. at 226. 
127 A century before Demosthenes, Antigone’s appeal against Creon’s order to the “unwrit-
ten and steadfast customs of the Gods” had evidenced the inferiority of human rule-making 
to Natural Law. Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitu-
tional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 154 (1954). Here, in the drama by Sophocles, Creon rep-
resents the Greek tyrant who disturbs the ancient harmony of the city-state. See generally 
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Exploring the conflict between claims of the state and the claims of an indi-
vidual conscience, this drama has since been taken to represent the incon-
testable supremacy of Natural Law over human-made law. Later, in the 
nineteenth-century, Henry David Thoreau, noting that men live with “too 
passive a regard for the moral laws,”128 cited to Antigone as a stirring exam-
ple of civil disobedience. 
The Natural Law foundations of international law are indisputably 
the legal foundations of the United States of America. When Jefferson 
wrote the Declaration of Independence, he consulted extensively the writ-
ings of Aristotle, Cicero,129 Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and 
especially Locke.130 The Declaration posits a natural order in the world 
whose laws are external to all human will, and which are discoverable 
through human reason.  
Although, by the eighteenth century, God was presumed to have 
withdrawn from any immediate or direct contact with humankind (having 
been transformed into a “Prime Mover” of the universe), “Nature” provided 
an apt substitute. Reflecting the decisive influence of Isaac Newton, whose 
Principia was first published in 1686, all of creation was now to be taken as 
  
SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (Gilbert Murray trans., 1941). Aristotle, in his RHETORIC, quotes from 
Sophocles’ Antigone when he argues that “an unjust law is not a law.” Corwin, supra; see 
also ARISTOTLE, Rhetorica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1374 (Richard McKeon ed., 
3rd prtg. 1941). 
128 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN, OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS; AND, “ON THE DUTY OF 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE” (1960). 
129 In the best-known passage of DE REPUBLICA, Cicero set forth the classic statement on 
Natural Law:  
True law is right reason, harmonious with nature, diffused among all, constant, 
eternal; a law which calls to duty by its commands and restrains from evil by its 
prohibitions . . . . It is a sacred obligation not to attempt to legislate in contradiction 
to this law; nor may it be derogated from nor abrogated. Indeed, by neither the 
Senate nor the people can we be released from this law; nor does it require any but 
ourself [sic] to be its expositor or interpreter. Nor is it one law at Rome and another 
at Athens; one now and another at a later time; but one eternal and unchangeable 
law binding all nations through all time . . . . 
CORWIN, supra note 122, at 10 (alterations in original). Similarly, in his DE OFFICIIS, Cicero 
wrote:  
There is in fact a true law namely right reason, which is in accordance with nature, 
applies to all men and is unchangeable and eternal . . . It will not lay down one rule 
at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule to-day and another to-
morrow. But there will be one law eternal and unchangeable binding at all times 
and upon all peoples. 
STONE, supra note 126, at 216 (alteration in original). 
130 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 123 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947). 
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an expression of divine will.131 It follows that the only way to know God’s 
will was then to discover the Law of Nature. Jefferson, via Locke, had both 
deified Nature, and denatured God. 
In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia established a conclusive legal end 
to the idea that an enemy was a criminal or heretic upon whom one could 
properly wage a war of annihilation. Here, the idea was first codified that an 
opponent was presumably a “just enemy,” one upon whom only limited war 
could be waged in order to protect universal human rights. In principle, at 
least, this idea has now become normatively binding under international 
law. 
At the same time, when so much current terror violence is under-
taken under the particular anti-Reason banner of jihad, there has emerged a 
new and unique challenge to the ordinary belligerent standards of humani-
tarian international law. Today, jihad represents a noteworthy regression 
toward a genuinely pre-Westphalian notion of “total war,” toward an intol-
erable idea of armed conflict that is premised upon an enemy’s presumed 
subhumanity, and on that enemy’s irremediable lack of “sacredness.” Faced 
with this harsh notion, the only lawful alternative to extraordinary means of 
remediation, including assassination or extrajudicial execution, may some-
times be craven surrender to barbarism.  
In such stark circumstances, the long-standing jurisprudential obli-
gation to protect the innocent in world politics should trump all other obli-
gations, and individual states engaged in purposeful counter-terrorism – 
whether or not they are involved in any identifiable war – should be guided 
by the peremptory rule of all civilized legal systems: Nullum crimen sine 
poena, “No crime without a punishment.” 
Under international law, assassination, or targeted killing, is not in-
herently wrong, or criminal. When dealing with a Hostes humani generis, a 
“common enemy of mankind,” as was certainly the case with Osama bin 
Laden, it was not necessary for the Obama administration to argue single-
mindedly that a determinable state of war had already been in existence 
with al-Qaeda, and that the target victim had either been armed, or had re-
fused to raise his hands, in responsible surrender. Leaving aside the legal 
problem of considering an adversarial relationship with any terrorist group 
as a proper state of war, Osama bin Laden was already an indicted interna-
tional criminal whose egregious terror crimes had been executed “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,”132 and who had openly threatened similar or still-greater 
crimes in the future.133  
  
131 “This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could only proceed from the 
counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” ISAAC NEWTON, PRINCIPIA 426 
(Stephen Hawking ed., 2002) (1848). 
132 An integral problem of permissible assassination under international law concerns this 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard—an evidentiary doctrine associated more correctly 
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Writing as a guest columnist in Jurist shortly after the Osama bin 
Laden assassination, the distinguished legal scholar, Amos N. Guiora, ex-
pressed the following view: 
According to the principles of self-defense enshrined in the U.N. Charter, 
the nation-state has a right to protect itself when attacked. Notwithstanding 
important questions regarding the limits and legality of pre-emptive self-
defense, bin Laden’s continued threats and his proven ability to successful-
ly conduct attacks – 9/11 in particular – unequivocally categorized him as 
a legitimate target at the time he was killed. The attack, therefore, was not 
an act of retribution under international law. It also adhered to fundamen-
tal international law principles, including distinction, military necessity, 
proportionality and alternatives. As a result, the operation was the mani-
festation of lawful and legitimate self-defense.
134
 
Whether considered to be punishment (retributive justice), or as an-
ticipatory self-defense, or both, the May 1, 2011 U.S. killing of Osama bin 
Laden was, prima facie, both lawful and law-enforcing. In the absence of 
such correct and defensible unilateral operations, in fact, we would all likely 
descend into a chaotic world of even wider killing and Dantesque darkness, 
an utterly unforgiving world of protracted conflict. 
In the final analysis, whether or not assassination or targeted killing 
can be properly construed as lawful or law-enforcing in particular settings 
will derive from the persistently Westphalian logic of international law, 
from the multiple sources of international law identified at Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and from the frequently irrec-
  
with arrest, pretrial examination, and grand jury indictment in the Anglo-American criminal 
justice system. Just how certain, prospective sponsors of assassination as humanitarian inter-
vention must inquire, is it that intended target persons are actually “guilty” of pertinent and 
egregious crimes “beyond a reasonable doubt?” While judgments of “probable cause” in 
municipal legal settings are made in the context of arrest and search standards, within the 
international legal order, these judgments would need to be arrived at in an extra-judicial 
setting. Of course, judgments rendered in an extra-judicial setting will lead not to any in-
dictment and prosecution, but to targeted killing or assassination. 
133 This also brings to mind the much-earlier argument of Alberico Gentili, who already 
understood that any nation acting against pirates was acting on behalf of the entire world 
community. By conceptualizing modern terrorists as the equivalent of the earlier Hostes 
humani generis or “Common enemies of mankind,” we can understand Gentili’s position as 
an endorsement of current American actions to thwart terrorists, especially those terrorists 
with mega-destruction ideals and objectives:  
And if a war against pirates justly calls all men to arms because of love of our 
neighbor, and the desire to live in peace, so also do the general violations of the 
common law of humanity and a wrong done to mankind . . . . Therefore war should 
be made against pirates by all men, because in the violation of that law we are all 
injured, and individuals in turn can find their personal rights violated . . . . 
GENTILI, supra note 93, at 124 (alterations in original). 
134 Guiora, supra note 2.  
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oncilable nature of competing peremptory norms. Were our world legal 
order more effectively centralized, and/or the mechanisms of extradition 
and prosecution more reliable, resorts to assassination or targeted killing as 
a lawful option would likely disappear. 
We have been concerned with the crisis of international law, espe-
cially in Northern Africa and the Middle East. To an extent, the “new” 
Northern Africa and Middle East remain very much the “old” Northern Af-
rica and Middle East. At the level of particular leaders and governments, 
dramatic transformations are plainly underway; yet, the underlying axes of 
age-old conflict remain much as they have always been. 
The “Arab Spring” has already become an “Arab Summer,” and, 
thereafter, an “Arab Autumn.” For the future, the crisis of international law 
(and the associated crises within international law) will also have to be con-
fronted in the context of humanitarian intervention, or the so-called “duty to 
protect.” As of late summer 2011, the international community is especially 
focused on rescuing both Libya and Syria from authoritarian rule.  
Serious questions must be raised about the permissible range of any 
such interventions, including the right to assassinate pertinent leaders. Of 
course, even as no single government or international organization would 
ever dare say that it could countenance the targeted killing of Muamar 
Gadhafi and/or Bashir al-Assad, a de facto hope of all engaged foreign mili-
tary forces in the region is certainly, inter alia, to kill these particular dicta-
tors. 
International law does not sanctify sovereignty at all costs. Ac-
knowledging the peremptory character of a human rights regime, it has now 
authoritatively transported a broad range of state-inflicted harms from the 
realm of “domestic jurisdiction,” to one of “international concern.”135 In the 
post-Nuremberg world legal order, international law has substantially en-
larged the right of particular states, individually, or collectively,136 to inter-
  
135 In contrast to the principle of “domestic jurisdiction,” codified at Article 15, paragraph 
8, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and at Article 2, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Char-
ter, which recognizes a reserved domain within which a State can act at its own discretion, 
“international concern” recognizes limits on this domain that are compelled by matters of an 
absolutely overriding importance. These matters pertain to a variety of peremptory norms of 
international law, especially those involving restraint in the use of armed force, and also 
respect for guaranteed minimum standards of human rights. League of Nations Covenant art. 
15, para. 8. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
136 Under the terms of Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, member States are urged to “take 
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization” to promote human rights. 
U.N. Charter art. 56. Reinforced by a now-abundant body of ancillary prescriptions, this 
obligation stipulates that the legal community of humankind must allow, indeed, require, 
“humanitarian intervention” in particular circumstances. Id. Such interventions must never be 
used as mere pretext for aggression, and must also conform to all settled legal norms govern-
ing the use of force. 
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vene within the territory of certain other states, in order to prevent egregious 
depredations of human rights. 
To date, however, there have been too few examples of timely and 
law-enforcing humanitarian interventions. This is the case despite the fol-
lowing observation, back in 1946, by the British Chief Prosecutor at Nu-
remberg: 
Normally, international law concedes that it is for the State to decide how 
it shall treat its own nationals; it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction . . . . 
Yet, international law has in the past made some claim that there is a limit 
to the omnipotence of the State and that the individual human being, the 
ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind 
when the State tramples upon its rights in a manner that outrages the con-
science of mankind. . . . The fact is that the right of humanitarian interven-
tion by war is not a novelty in international law—can intervention by judi-
cial process then be illegal?
137
 
For the most part, too little concern for humanitarian intervention 
has been the result of the post-Westphalian system of world politics, a con-
tinuing network of national power relations that still sanctifies untrammeled 
competition between sovereign States, and that still effectively identifies 
national loyalties as the most overriding human obligation. Such identifica-
tion is ironic, as even Jean Bodin, who first advanced the idea of sovereign-
ty as a form of authority free of any external control or internal division, 
fully recognized the limits imposed by both “divine law,” and natural law. 
Although States have always sought an improved power position in 
the midst of worldwide anarchy, the full sanctification of the State is essen-
tially a development of modern times. This regrettable sanctification, repre-
senting a break from the traditional political realism of Thucydides, Thra-
symachus138 and Machiavelli, was first elaborated in Germany. From Fichte 
and Hegel, through Ranke and von Treitschke,139 changes in realpolitik 
have transformed the State into a “God.” 140 These changes, in turn, have 
been spawned by the progressive weakening of competing objects of human 
  
137 U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History 
and Analysis: Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General, 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 
(1949). 
138 “‘[R]ight’ is the . . . ‘interest of the stronger,” says Thrasymachus in Plato’s THE 
REPUBLIC. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 33 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 25th prtg. 2008). 
139 In his published lectures on Politics, von Treitschke cites approvingly to Fichte: “Indi-
vidual man sees in his country the realisation [sic] of his earthly immortality.” 1 VON 
TREITSCHKE, supra note 102, at 15. 
140 “The State is the march of God in the world . . . .” HEGEL, supra note 102, at 247. 
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loyalty, other “herds,”141 from which individuals have traditionally drawn a 
more-or-less palpable measure of self-esteem and private reassurance. 
In properly assessing the permissibility of assassination as humani-
tarian intervention, it is vital that we make an antecedent operational dis-
tinction: Will the assassination or targeted killing be undertaken as: (1) a 
military operation; or (2) as a covert, intelligence service, action? Although, 
in neither case, are governments likely to acknowledge the assassination 
objective, a military operation will still be more difficult to deny, and also 
more easy to assess. In Option 1 (above), the State undertaking the assassi-
nation would likely be more concerned with satisfying pertinent legal ex-
pectations than in Option 2 (above). 
For now, in view of current jurisprudential risks in employing as-
sassination or targeted killing as a military operation, States are apt to 
choose Option 1 over Option 2 only where there already exist certain offset-
ting tactical advantages, i.e., only where the expected operational ad-
vantages of a military killing over a covert killing are great enough to out-
weigh any perceived legal disadvantages.  
If, however, it were publicly and authoritatively recognized that as-
sassination or targeted killing could represent an approved and gainful form 
of law enforcement (usually, only in the most residual circumstances), 
States could become more willing to acknowledge this controversial remedy 
from among their available tactical options. And here, because of the en-
hanced openness, states could more readily appraise assassination or target-
ed killings  according to the humanitarian rules of armed conflict, a devel-
opment that could then diminish the traditional excesses that may always 
accompany assassination or targeted killing. 
Tyrannicide has normally been treated in political philosophy as an 
intra-national assassination. But where it is carried out by decision-makers 
and operators from another State, acting in defense of egregiously imperiled 
human rights in the target State, tyrannicide could also represent an authen-
tic form of humanitarian intervention. To qualify as a permissible killing in 
such circumstances, the authorizing decision-makers would, at a minimum, 
need to (1) determine that extensive and far-reaching crimes against per-
emptory human rights were underway in the target State; (2) determine that 
ordinary methods of international diplomacy, including gaining custody via 
normal processes of extradition or even forcible abduction were unable to 
stop these crimes; (3) determine that assassination could promptly and most 
effectively put an end to ongoing crimes (e.g., crimes of war, crimes against 
  
141 Nietzsche says, “To lure many away from the herd, for that I have come. The people 
and the herd shall be angry with me: Zarathustra wants to be called a robber by the shep-
herds.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ALL AND NONE 23 
(Walter Kaufmann trans., Penguin Books 1978) (1966). Elsewhere in ZARATHUSTRA, Nie-
tzsche calls the State “the coldest of all cold monsters.” Id. at 48. 
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peace; crimes against humanity; genocide; genocide-like-crimes, slavery; 
torture); (4) determine that assassination will be directed toward the abso-
lute lowest number of human rights abusers needed to restore a dignified 
and safe public order; and (5) determine that assassination would be the 
most cost-effective remedy available; that is, that it would produce the 
smallest amount of cumulative harms, in comparison to all other still avail-
able forms of humanitarian intervention.142 
All of these listed determinations are problematic. Individually or 
collectively, they could easily be founded upon erroneous assumptions, 
and/or on incorrect information. Nonetheless, the only true alternative to 
such difficult judgments in our still-decentralized system of international 
law is a more or less general renunciation of humanitarian intervention or 
“duty to protect” as a remedy for major crimes against persons or groups;143 
or a more or less general reliance upon even broader uses of force as meth-
ods of humanitarian intervention. Recognizing that the first alternative 
could produce legions of additional innocent human victims, year after year, 
and that the second alternative could represent a far costlier means of essen-
tial international law enforcement, assassination or targeted killing should 
not be dismissed too readily as a permissible form of humanitarian interven-
  
142 In reference to this criterion of “cost-effectiveness,” assassination or targeted killing 
could fulfill the expectations of Nullum crimen sine poena, or “No crime without a punish-
ment.” This is because this remedy would accept the right of humanitarian intervention and 
of proportionality, both military (because it would represent the least injurious form of hu-
manitarian intervention, and is therefore most proportionate to the objective sought) and 
political (because the resulting harm could be expected to be less than the harm that would 
ensure if no assassination were to take place). From a philosophical perspective, fulfilling the 
requirements of political proportionality would reveal a Utilitarian argument for assassina-
tion—that is, one where expected consequences become the criterion for determining the 
reasonableness of assassination. From the Utilitarian point of view, only those consequences 
that offer good reason for acting or not acting, in this case, for choosing to accept or reject 
assassination. In this framework, considerations of justice or desert do not count in their own 
right. See Louis René Beres, Assassination, Law and Justice: A Policy Perspective, available 
at http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~lberes/assaspol.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
143 For a classic example of this position, we may consider the seventeenth-century legal 
scholar, Francisco Suarez. Contra the argument that sovereignty is not absolute (an argument 
strengthened and codified by the post-Nuremberg world legal order), and that the preroga-
tives of full sovereignty must be forfeited whenever there are egregious human rights abuses 
underway, Suarez asserts:  
Wherefore, the assertion made by some writers, that sovereign kings have the pow-
er of avenging injuries done in any part of the world, is entirely false, and throws 
into confusion all the orderly distinctions of jurisdiction; for such power was not 
[expressly] granted by God and its existence is not to be inferred by any process of 
reasoning.  
2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver: Book I: Concerning Law 
in General; and Concerning its Nature, Causes and Effects, reprinted in SELECTIONS FROM 
THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ 817 (Gwladys L. Williams et al. ed. & trans., 1944) 
(alteration in original) (treating the study of law as a branch of theology). 
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tion. At a minimum, it warrants considerable further study by an informed 
and dispassionate community of capable international law scholars. 
In the best of all possible worlds, our world legal order would create 
“neither victims nor executioners,”144 but such an optimal configuration of 
global power and authority is assuredly not yet on the horizon. For an inter-
national law system in crisis, the core challenge is not to pretend that “ex-
traordinary remedies” are never permissible, or that such remedies will, in 
time, simply “go away.” 
What is to be done? One possibility would be the authoritative crea-
tion of a pertinent “Draft Code” concerning assassination and targeted kill-
ing. An expected outcome of such a preliminary codification effort could be 
stricter regulation of these forms of killing as transnational activity, and also 
certain corollary reductions in associated peripheral harms. These reduc-
tions could conceivably bring assassination and targeted killing within the 
proper ambit of international legal regulation. 
The alternative would be “business as usual,” pretending that such 
forms of killing as remediation are not at all subject to normative regulation 
by international law. To be sure, any such pretense would not inhibit the 
incidence of assassination or targeted killing, and it would also likely ensure 
a continuing incapacity to bring such killing under effective regulatory 
guidelines and control. If we can accept that an intrinsically uncontrollable 
activity such as war can and should be regulated by international law, 
mustn’t we also be able to accept that there can be aptly codified regulations 
of violence short of war? Significantly, any such acceptance could be entire-
ly consistent with classical writings on this subject, writings that are identi-
fied at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as an 
authoritative “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
Cicero, in his speech in defense of Milo, is able to support assassi-
nation (in our terms, as a form of anticipatory self-defense145): 
  
144 See generally ALBERT CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS (Dwight Macdon-
ald ed., World Without War Council, 1968) (1946). Confronting what he called our “century 
of fear,” Camus asks us all to become “neither victims nor executioners,” living not in a 
world in which killing has disappeared (“we are not as crazy as that!”), but one wherein 
killing has at least become illegitimate. This is a fine expectation of refined French philoso-
phy, but it can hardly be taken as realistic by contemporary international law. After all, de-
prived of the capacity to act as lawful executioners, both states and individuals within states, 
facing aggression, and/or egregious human rights violations, would be forced by Camus’ 
reasoning to become victims. Ultimately, the problem with Camus’ argument, and also a core 
problem of idealistic orientations to international law, is that the still-ubiquitous will to kill 
remains unimpressed by others’ “goodness.” It follows, especially for scholars of interna-
tional law, that both within states, and between states, executioners must have their rightful 
place. Without these executioners, there would only be more victims. Id. 
145 Later, Hugo Grotius, in his classic COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, 
recalls Cicero’s argument, but more generally to support a “just war:” Says Grotius:  
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But if there be any occasion on which it is proper to slay a man,—and 
there are many such,—surely that occasion is not only a just one, but even 
a necessary one, when violence is offered, and can only be repelled by vio-
lence . . . .  
What is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords? Surely it would 
never be permitted to us to have them if we might never use them. This, 
therefore, is a law, O judges, not written . . . or read, but which we have 
taken and sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were 
not taught, but to which we were made,—which we were not trained in, 
but which is ingrained in us,—namely, that if our life be in danger from 
plots, or from open violence, or from the weapons of robbers or enemies, 
every means of securing our safety is honorable. For laws are silent when 
arms are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for, when he 




This important conference has been convened on the presumption 
that international law must now function more effectively “in times of cri-
sis,” and that these events “are pushing international law itself to the brink 
of crisis.”147 With this in mind, we have seen that there will be continuing 
tensions between the interpenetrating values of public safety and individual 
liberty. Sometimes, these legal and moral judgments will be entirely intra-
national, especially in regard to prevention of terrorism.148 Sometimes, as 
  
Now, as Cicero explains, this [justification for extra-legal warfare] exists whenever 
he who chooses to wait [for legal authorization] will be obliged to pay an unjust 
penalty before he can exact a just penalty; and, in a general sense, it exists when-
ever matters do not admit of delay. Thus, it is obvious that a just war can be waged 
in return, without recourse to judicial procedure, against an opponent who has be-
gun an unjust war; nor will any declaration of that just war be required . . . For—as 
Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority—any war undertaken for the necessary 
repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by a crier nor by a herald but by the voice of 
Nature herself.  
HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND 
BOOTY 96 (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1950) 
(1604) [hereinafter GROTIUS, PRIZE AND BOOTY] (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
146 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, SELECT ORATIONS OF M.T. CICERO177–78 (C.D. Yonge 
trans., New York, Harper & Bros. 1896). Although, strictly speaking, Cicero speaks here not 
of assassination as anticipatory self-defense by states, but rather as defense by endangered 
individuals, his argument actually applies especially to state action. This is the case because 
if individuals should be granted such great latitude in protecting their merely personal lives, 
the preemptive latitude of a state in preserving its collective life should be far greater. 
147 International Law in Crisis, FREDERICK K. COX INT’L L. CTR. http://law.case.edu 
/centers/cox/content.asp?content_id=191 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).  
148 A most interesting (and controversial example) is the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. 
citizen whose targeted killing had been officially approved by President Barack Obama. See 
Scott Shane, U.S. Approval of Killing of Cleric Causes Unease, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, 
at A1. Should an American president be authorized to order the extra-judicial killing of an 
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we have been considering the obligations and limitations of anticipatory 
self-defense, assassination, and humanitarian intervention, these judgments 
will be distinctly inter-national. In Northern Africa and the Middle East, the 
world community is already engaged formally and directly with the situa-
tions in Libya and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Soon, too, the U.N. will like-
ly take up the difficult question of a Palestinian state.  
How shall international law respond to these ongoing and pending 
crises, and to the associated wider matters of war avoidance and interna-
tional criminal prosecution? There is much to be learned here from both 
history, and from the classical writers (e.g., Grotius; Vattel; Pufendorf, etc.). 
The core challenges, it seems, will come from the relentless structural con-
straints of a persistently state-centric, Westphalian system of law, and from 
the closely associated expectations of realpolitik.  
In reference to these geopolitical expectations, we may benefit more 
precisely from understanding little-known aspects of the post-World War II 
history of the U.S. The U.S. has, as a matter of indisputable record, engaged 
in assassination since 1945, in time of war, and in time of peace. Whatever 
the status of relevant prohibitions, national and international, U.S. presi-
dents have, from time to time, opted for assassination, as a presumably pur-
poseful and cost-effective strategy. 
During the Cold War, several U.S. presidents approved the assassi-
nation of certain foreign leaders.149 These targets of American assassination 
included Cuba’s Fidel Castro (unsuccessful) and Chile’s Salvador Allende 
(successful). According to the Select Senate Committee that investigated 
these plots: “United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro 
from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to 
Castro were used in these plots, and were provided encouragement and ma-
terial support by the United States.”150 
William Colby, former Director of CIA (DCI), corroborates this as-
sessment: 
[T]he most significant consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that it 
exacerbated the Kennedys’ fury over Castro, and intensified their determi-
nation to use the CIA and its covert action capability “to get rid of him,” 
with all the ambiguity the phrase includes. For this purpose, that ace clan-
  
American citizen, without any rights to due process of law? The affirmative response is 
necessarily tied to the presumed urgency of the threat posed, and most plainly exemplifies 
the core tension between individual rights and public safety in the United States. In late 
September 2011, al-Awlaki was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen. See C.I.A. Strike 
Kills U.S.-born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1.  
149 See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. 
DOC. NO. 94-465, at 4–6 (1st Sess. 1975) [hereinafter ASSASSINATION PLOTS]. 
150 Id. at 4–5.  
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destine operator, Desmond Fitzgerald, was transferred to head the special 
Cuban Task Force . . . . While Operation Mongoose . . . was soon disband-
ed, Fitzgerald, under Robert Kennedy’s close scrutiny, launched a series of 
operations . . . against Cuba. And this campaign included renewed at-
tempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, which had started in 1960, and were 
sporadically prosecuted from 1961 to 1963 . . . .
151
 
The successful assassination of President Allende grew out of the 
Chilean coup of September 11, 1973. A Select Senate Committee concluded 
that, in addition to the Cuban and Chilean cases, and also to particular cases 
involving the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and South Vietnam, ranking 
officials of the U.S. Government had authorized “a generalized assassina-
tion capability” within the Central Intelligence Agency.152 From the stand-
point of both national and international law, however, all of these assassina-
tion plots were illegal.  
While they were likely conceived with the commendable intent of 
the U.S.’s national security, they were plainly an expression of pure realpo-
litik. Such concern is not a permissible rationale for any transnational use of 
force, including (and perhaps, especially) assassination. Although, as we 
have already seen, inter alia, there may be a residual right of assassination 
as a form of anticipatory self-defense, there was never any reason to believe 
that potential threats allegedly posed by Cuba or Chile were sufficiently 
immediate and overwhelming to warrant a proper invocation of this right.153 
 
VII. GETTING BACK TO BASICS: THE NEED FOR HUMAN 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
In the end, all of the insidious behaviors that we fear in world poli-
tics—war, terrorism, and genocide—are indisputable manifestations of in-
dividual human needs and failings. This suggests that, ultimately, we will 
need to go beyond even the most ambitious structural alterations of world 
  
151 WILLIAM COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE MEN: MY LIFE IN THE CIA 189–90 
(1978). 
152 ASSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 149, at 5. 
153 See LOUIS RENÉ BERES, AMERICAN OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 72 (1987) (noting President Kennedy’s irrational behavior regarding the 
“quarantine” of Cuba based on assumption of 50-50 chance of nuclear war); see also Louis 
René Beres, Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in 
Central America, 14 DENV. J. INT’L. & POL’Y 76, 76–86 (1985) (providing background on 
the principle that foreign intervention into a state is unlawful unless to correct gross viola-
tions of human rights, the U.N. Charter prohibition on lawless insurgencies, and the underly-
ing motivation of assassination plots in Central America were realpolitik and anti-
Sovietism); see also LOUIS RENÉ BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
AND WORLD ORDER 1–3 (1984) (providing background on U.S. strategy of realpolitik and 
U.S. support of regimes overthrowing their respective governments).  
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politics, beyond even modifications of realpolitik. The practical problem, of 
course, is that fundamental changes in human behavior, however desirable, 
are also manifestly infeasible. 
But let us at least consider what is needed. After all, if planetary 
survival is literally at stake, we ought at least to explore every conceivable 
transformational option. 
At the “molecular” level, an orientation traditionally ignored by le-
gal scholars, the survival crises that we face are the inevitable byproduct of 
a human species that has scandalized itself from the time of creation. Still 
slouched in a bruising darkness, our fragmented species always insists upon 
discovering its critical inner meanings in competing and hostile “tribes.”  
These tribes, always ready and poised for some form or other of 
gratuitous slaughter, now include almost 200 separately sovereign states. 
These remain mortal dangers not only to each other directly, but also via 
literally thousands of armed surrogates that we (depending upon our respec-
tive ideologies) call either “terrorists” or “freedom fighters.” Armed with 
the most terrible secrets of physics and biology, now torn hideously from 
nature, these more-or-less organized proxies threaten not only the “usual” 
forms of murderous harms, but also mega-attacks using weaponized patho-
gens or fissile materials.154 
The State in world politics is the individual human being writ large, 
a corporate manifestation of will, fear, and anxiety that commands institu-
tional misdeeds because of its constituent human misfortunes. A vehicle 
designed not merely to protect persons, but also to assuage doubts about 
belonging and immortality, the State is always preparing to accept large-
scale violence as redemption. Here, in this upside-down world that contin-
ues to revolve around the creation of corpses, international law has made 
little recognizable progress. 
The dominant orthodoxy among students and practitioners of inter-
national law is that world politics is a “struggle for power.” This thinking is 
assuredly correct, but it is also trivial. This is because the struggle for power 
in world legal order is always epiphenomenal. It is only what underlies this 
struggle that makes things as they truly are. And what underlie this struggle 
are the individual human being’s private apprehensions, needs, and terrors, 
including even the often all-consuming human fear of death, and the corol-
lary search for immortality. In consequence, ideology in world politics fre-
  
154 As a timely example, U.S. counterterrorism officials are increasingly concerned that the 
most dangerous regional faction of al-Qaeda is now trying to produce the very lethal poison, 
ricin. The terrorist group’s intent, these officials believe, is that the ricin be packed around 
small explosives for multiple and possibly simultaneous attacks against the United States. 
“For more than a year, according to classified intelligence reports, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in 
Yemen has been attempting to acquire large quantities of castor beans, which are needed to 
produce ricin . . . .” Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 20. 
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quently becomes theology, and opposition to particular policies comes to 
represent not dissent, but blasphemy. 
“Everything in this world exudes crimes,” says Baudelaire, “the 
newspapers, the walls, and the face of man.” Yet, this “face” does not be-
long solely to what Hugo Grotius called “men of deplorable wickedness.” 
155 The overriding problem of international law enforcement is not that of 
Hostes humani generis, but rather the “normal” human being, who adheres 
closely to most societal expectations, while secretly dreaming of corpses. It 
was this ordinary human being, not the wicked monsters of traditional inter-
national legal philosophy, who made possible all of the past century’s worst 
crimes of war, terrorism, crimes against peace, and crimes against humani-
ty. 
Before international law can escape from its current crisis, and, ac-
cordingly, before it can help to resolve the most pressing of our world order 
crises, international society must first learn to look beyond ostensibly “in-
human” cruelties, to what Friedrich Nietzsche had aptly called (1878) the 
“human, all-too human.”156 Predominantly “banal,”157 this predilection still 
eludes detection and understanding everywhere, but it remains the indispen-
sable starting point for egregious international crimes. Spawned by a relent-
less drive to escape from individuality, and individual human responsibility, 
the inclination to do harm to others is the seemingly-indelible mark of a 
timeless and universal “sickness of the soul,”158 of a delirious collectivism 
of robots that somehow identifies real life with the sacred killing of “outsid-
ers.” 
In the end, like it or not, the seriousness with which we approach 
crises in and for our profession will depend upon our prior willingness to 
challenge and to change the “human, all-too human.” This task will be 
overwhelming, and will take a very long time, during which circumstances 
of war, terrorism and genocide will remain pretty much as they have always 
been. Nonetheless, humankind generally, and international law in particular, 
has no effective choice. More than anything else, human transformations 
must signal a retreat from what the philosopher Martin Heidegger called das 
  
155 GROTIUS, PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 145, at 90.  
156 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS (Alexander 
Harvey trans., 1908) 
157 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY 
OF EVIL (1963) (discussing the banality of evil with regards to Nazi involvement in the Holo-
caust). 
158 I adapt this expression from my general readings of both Søren Kierkegaard and Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky. See generally SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS 
UNTO DEATH (Walter Lowrie trans., 1954) (discussing the unwillingness of the human being 
to be oneself in relation to the willingness to get rid of oneself); FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE 
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Constance Garnett trans., 1943) (addressing the notion of sickness 
of the soul through a fictional story). 
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Mann, the anonymous “mass,” or “crowd,” or “herd” that suffocates per-
sonal growth and individual responsibility. 
We must, while there is still time, bring new insights to the study 
and practice of international law, not the pleasingly idealized images of 
human behavior that still inhabit the expanding debris of formal legal schol-
arship, but rather the utterly tragic insights that are based upon who we truly 
are, who we have truly been, and who we are truly most likely to become. 
This intimidating imperative applies to all regions of our prevailing world 
legal order, for Northern Africa and the Middle East, which has been the 
geographic focus of this particular piece, and also to absolutely everywhere 
else on this increasingly imperiled planet. In a world still deeply obsessed 
with the eternal gibberish of politics, we must finally understand that our 
survival problems are, first and foremost, intellectual problems. To build a 
viable system of international law, we will need, above all, to confront the 
stunningly complex jurisprudential and societal issues from the converging 
standpoints of real vision and meaningful theoretical thought. 
 
